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JPRS L/8346

22 March 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
(FOUO 17/79)

WEST

EUROPE

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

FRENCH, SPANISH ACT TO CONTROL ETA

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 5 Feb 79 pp 27-28

[Article: "The French Sanctuary"]

[Text] A sanctuary for the ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] terrorists: the French Basque country. The authorities have reacted. Perhaps in order to forestall the Spanish special services.

The police took action Tuesday, 30 January, at daybreak. At Saint-Jean-de-Luz, Bayonne, and Hendaye, about 20 Spanish Basques were arrested. Thirteen of them were immediately sent to a place of detention in the Alpes-de-Haute-Provence. The others were escorted back to the border.

All of these 20 Basques belong to the ETA, the separatist organization. In ordering their arrest, the minister of interior was cooperating with the Madrid government, which complains again and again about the asylum which the ETA terrorists enjoy on French territory. It doubtless also wanted to prevent serious incidents. In less than six months, three attacks were made against Basque refugees on French soil. A persistent rumor has been crediting the Spanish special services with intending to settle "a la Israeli" the ETA problem that is implanted in the Atlantic Pyrenees.

This department has about 15,000 Spanish residents--including about a thousand political refugees who have settled since 1936; and about 300 militants of the military ETA, who have settled in Labourd province, all along the Basque coast, from Hendaye to Bayonne, with a maximum density in Saint-Jean-de-Luz. Some of these "etarrak" [ETA partisans] have a Spanish passport; others have only a visitor's permit.

Political asylum in the past was granted to them on condition that they pledge in writing to renounce all political activity of a violent nature and not to illegally cross the French-Spanish border. Martin Villa, Spanish minister of interior, felt that this liberalism was open to criticism. At each meeting with the French authorities, he repeated:

"Since the most recent amnesty has granted all Spanish citizens restitution of their rights and freedoms, it is intolerable that there should still be any Spanish political refugees in your country."

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The French government has conceded this point, again presented by Marcelino Oreja, Spanish minister of Foreign Affairs, at the time of his recent trip to Paris. The status of political refugee has been eliminated for Spaniards residing in France. Henceforth only workers having a pass certifying their status will be admitted. That could be an additional obstacle to the implantation of the ETA north of the Pyrenees.

These political refugees as a matter of fact in great part are clandestine persons who have been identified by the Spanish police and who go to France for asylum. Or else "gudaris" (fighters) who come to receive training, far from the spies of the civilian guard and the armed police. The latter stay only briefly on this side of the Pyrenees, while the former most of the time settle here permanently, without, however, breaking the ties that unite them to their organization.

A third group of refugees--the least numerous, but by far the most active--consists of members of the "Tactical Executive Committee" of the ETA.

Just as the "High Strategic Command," supreme executive organ that works with the ETA assembly, seems to be a ponderous and static organization, the Executive Committee, which is responsible for making decisions in a very short span of time, is operational and mobile. It consists of only about 10 clandestine fighters, all with combat records.

Each is responsible for a specific sector of activities. Thus Jose Miguel Benaran Ordenana, known as Argala, who was killed on 21 December, was considered to be the theorist of the military ETA. Jose Manuel Paguada Gallastegui, alias Peioto, killed this past 13 January in Saint-Jean-de-Luz, was in charge of the organization's finances. A certain Txomin, a 36-year old native of Mondragon, allegedly is in charge of "interior commandos," etc.

The Basque coast offers living conditions that are almost ideal to these professional outsiders. The Bayonne-Anglet-Biarritz district constitutes a single agglomeration of more than 200,000 inhabitants. As in the case of all spas, Biarritz, Saint-Jean-de-Luz, and Hendaye abound in apartments that are empty or temporarily occupied. Thus housing matters are easily resolved. Political refugees, including certain members of the "executive committee," live there most often with women and children, not always under a false identity. Some of them work in Basque cooperatives, aided by the substantial Banco de Bilbao (leading Basque bank and third Spanish bank) and are inspired by the example of the industrial cooperatives of Mondragon (from which the majority of the ETA leaders come). Others are employed in local enterprises that are managed by sympathizers who hire them with full knowledge of the facts. Basque solidarity greatly favors brothers who are momentarily in trouble.

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As in the case of South Lebanon for Palestinians, the Basque coast is thus a reliable base for the "etarrak." Training camps were recently set up there. Several have been seen 20 kilometers east of Bayonne, on some isolated private properties, in the Iraty forest, the biggest forest in Europe, astride the border in the region of Saint-Jean-Pied-de-Port and in the region of Mauleon.

It seems that these camps have now been closed. The base has been transferred to Algeria, where about 20 fighters allegedly were trained this past year by Cuban instructors, near Algiers. And if one were to believe the Spanish press, some "gudaris" are now being trained in the Near East.

Some Basque refugees risk returning to their country. Thus, two armed fighters who were recently killed in Spain had visitor's permits to France that were still valid. The danger is great, but the leaders beyond the border have no choice, if they do not want to be outdone by a military base that is extremely tough and whose average age is lower and lower. It is not unusual now to see 16-year old boys among the commandos that are arrested by the Spanish police.

The ETA's base behind the lines in France also ensures a logistical function. A great portion of the equipment of the Basque commandos in fact transits through southwestern France, when the purchase is not simply negotiated on the spot at a high price. The ETA currently has a war fund that is estimated at more than 300 million pesetas (about 18 million francs). That makes it possible for them to buy Yugoslav pistols and Belgian FM's, Sten or Marietta submachine guns, and ammunition by sometimes paying three times their factory price. This potential market has not failed to attract weapons merchants of all nationalities. The French authorities recently refused one of them a permit to locate in Biarritz, itself.

The transitting of this equipment across the border poses little difficulty. The Basque country has always been a contraband domain. In this connection, the border police have discovered automobiles equipped with secret hiding places. Forwarding of merchandise is accomplished in particular by sea. In September 1978, the freighter, "Allul," was stopped and searched in the vicinity of Bilbao by Spanish coastguard ships. It was transporting 2,830 FAL 50 guns, intended in all probability for the ETA.

Politically, the ETA receives help from French autonomist circles. The latter include the staff and readers of the newspaper, ENBATA (SEA BREEZE), who feel more at home in a cultural fight than in violent activity; the association, Arnai Artea (Among Brothers), that provides mutual aid; and the small Ehas Party [Socialist Party of the Basque People], of socialist leaning, which publishes the magazine, ESKUALDUNAK. There is also a group of lawyers

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who sympathetically provide defense for the "abertzales" (Basque patriots) who are harrassed by the French police. But all of that represents only a few hundred sympathizers.

There are three clandestine organizations north of the border, which could, should the occasion arise, support and prolong the activity of the military ETA. These are the "Iparretarak" ("The Northerners"), the "Hordago" ("One's All") movement, and "Euskal Zuzentasuna" ("The Basque Awakening"). These three organizations, with their fluctuating capability, up to now have been credited with about 15 assaults.

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BELGIUM

POLITICAL IMBROGLIO THREATENS UPSWING

Stockholm VECKANS AFFARER in Swedish 25 Jan 79 p 7

/Text/ The Belgian economy has been treading water--not least because of the political confusion--and the problem is growing somewhat this year. However, the rate of inflation has been brought down to 4 percent and the government is trying to stimulate consumption by lowering taxes, among other things.

The prevailing confusion on the political scene is greatly affecting developments in the Belgian economy. In October Prime Minister Leo Tindemans suddenly handed in his resignation and for the 34th time in 39 years Belgium was in the midst of a government crisis.

The reason this time, like so many times before, was a disagreement between the two language groups, the Flemish and the Walloons. By establishing a federal state in Belgium, Tindemans had hoped to largely eliminate these problems. However, the prime minister met with opposition in his own party, the Christian Socialist Party, and chose to resign, hoping to form a stronger government after the next election.

Today the country faces weeks, perhaps months, of tough negotiations in order to establish a government that has the power to act.

For the time being an important reform bill is awaiting action. Belgium's steel industry needs to be restructured.

A year ago last November a transitional government submitted a plan to reorganize the steel industry. But even here considerations must be given to the clash of interests between different parts of the country.

Belgium is among those countries that have great problems in connection with their traditional industry. The economy is slow and, consequently, the growth rate is moderate. In 1977 the gross national product rose by only 1.2 percent. It went up to 2 percent in 1978 and is expected to reach 3 percent in 1979

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Half of Belgium's labor force is employed in the export industry and Belgium is greatly dependent upon developments in West Germany, Holland and France in particular.

Hence, the economic upswing in West Germany provides a bright spot, which is reflected in growing industrial orders. In 1979 the export volume is expected to grow by 6 percent, while importation will go up by 5 percent.

As a result of the slow economic growth, Belgium's unemployment is remarkably high. About seven percent of the labor force is unemployed and there will be no improvement in 1979. There were 300,000 unemployed in Belgium at the beginning of 1979. This is an increase of between 4,000 and 5,000 compared to a year ago.

While the high rate of unemployment is one of the economy's greatest woes, the low rate of inflation is one of its joys. In 1976 consumer prices rose by more than 9 percent, but by the end of 1978 Belgium had managed to lower that figure to 4.5 percent. That development is expected to continue in 1979. At that rate, inflation should stop at 4 percent this year, matching the rate of inflation in West Germany and Holland.

Low consumer prices are partially due to a positive development in import prices, which, in turn, are the result of an upward evaluation of the Belgian franc. In order to remain in the Snake-cooperation, Belgium has had to implement massive support measures. During the past year the government spent 100 billion francs (about 15 billion kroner) to keep the Belgian currency on a par with the D-mark. It succeeded, except for a two percent reevaluation of the D-mark in October.

In spite of the fact that Belgium already enjoyed low taxes, another tax reduction was implemented at the beginning of the year, thereby raising the disposable income per household by 1 percent compared to 1978. Private consumption could go up by 2 percent, providing actual wages increases by 2 percent. Wages have gone up about 2 percent in the last 2 years, but are expected to increase by 2 percent in 1979.

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FRANCE

FRENCH POLLED ON FEELINGS OF NATIONALISM

Poll Results Encouraging

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 10 Feb 79 p 62

[Commentary by Albert du Roy: "Frenchmen, Are You Nationalists?"]

[Text] Valery Giscard d'Estaing will devote his entire press conference this Thursday to France's foreign policy. The Elysee says reporters must not question him about domestic policy.

Very well then! Let's not mention it. But what does he think of the ruling by the Court of Justice in the Hague, a ruling that Jacques Chirac says strips France of its nuclear independence? Is he afraid--as Georges Marchais and Michel Debre are--that Germany's economic power may secure it control of Europe? Does he deplore--along with the Christian Democratic leaders of the UDF [Union for French Democracy]--not being able to move faster and farther along the road to European integration?

It is obvious, therefore, that when Giscard discusses foreign policy this Thursday, he will quite definitely also be discussing domestic policy. Rarely has France ever become so passionately interested in what kind of relations it should maintain with the rest of the world. For the past few months, France's serious economic and social troubles have shown Frenchmen how insecure and dependent they are. And now the prospect of the 10 June European election has interjected this foreign policy theme into the heart of the national political debate.

Thus confronted with this unusual telescoping of their traditional partisan disputes into major international issues, are Frenchmen tempted by a nationalist reflex? Are they liable to withdraw within themselves? They have previously yielded to this temptation in the past. In the article that follows [immediately below], Paul Guilbert recalls nationalism's leftist and rightist roots. He also uncovers its new manifestations in positions taken by Chirac's supporters, legitimist Gaullists, communists, and the CERES [Center for Socialist Studies, Research, and Education].

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But what about the French people themselves? Do they concur with Marchais when he denounces the German threat? Do they agree with Chirac when he asserts that France's interests are being sold out? Whom do they fear the most: Russians, Americans, or the Third World? In a nutshell, are they afraid of the world to the point of withdrawing within the nation?

To find out, the Institut Louis Harris-France interviewed them in a most fascinating poll, each of whose 11 questions can trigger its own debate. Our conclusions drawn from this poll are outlined elsewhere in this issue [fourth and final item below]. These conclusions may well prove embarrassing to political leaders and their staffs.

Let there be no mistake about it: in asking these particular questions, we enter into the very heart of the most ticklish political debate. For instance, it would be highly interesting to ascertain whether after the 10 June [European] election, Chirac will be in a good position to oppose Giscard in the 1981 presidential election, whether Mitterrand or Rocard will win out in the PS [Socialist Party], and whether the May Communist Party Congress will in a small measure liberalize or not the internal operations of the PCF [French Communist Party].

But the major political issue of the moment lies elsewhere. The iron and steel companies in Lorraine, like the viticulturists in the south of France, must be the first ones to realize this. The issue in question involves the redealing of the international economic cards, and particularly the way France must play its hand, whether in isolation or allied to others.

The image Frenchmen project of themselves in our poll is rather encouraging. Are they nationalists? They do accept less readily than generally believed those convenient simplified explanations politicians too frequently offer them. They are definitely proud of being French, are even flag-wavers to some extent, but with lucidity.

Certain fears are perceptible. This apprehension is what may possibly soon rekindle nationalist feelings.

Roots of French Nationalism

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 10 Feb 79 pp 62, 63-64

[Article by Paul Guilbert]

[Text] In a letter to LE MONDE, the poet Xavier Grail, a Breton and a European, observed that "it is highly ludicrous to see so-called nationalists refer to national independence in such absolute and such fanatical terms as those employed by Michel Debre and Jacques Chirac. We can see the outline of Deroulede's [nationalist poet-politician, 1846-1914] bugle in the folds of the red flag."

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It is true that Georges Marchais very recently accused Giscard by name of "trying to lay the blame on foreign countries," thereby immediately reducing Chirac's earlier denunciation of the "foreigner's party" to mere allegory. In the East, communist troops carry vengeful banners proclaiming: "1870, 1914, 1940, enough!" and "Lorraine will not be sold out to the big German Konzern [trusts]." The CGT [General Confederation of Labor] calls on Frenchmen to remember the Resistance against the occupation.

Opposite them, Chirac stoutly maintains the resolve expressed in his appeal from Cochin [hospital]: "We will fight with all our strength to assure that after so many sacrifices, so many tribulations, so many lessons, our generation does not unwittingly give its consent to our country's decline." With similar vigor, Michel Debre warns his fellow citizens: "We are being thrown into a venture, short-winded, fettered, and blindfolded."

There have already been responses from "moderates" in the two camps: from the right, by Jacques Blanc, secretary general of the Republican Party, and from the left, by Edmond Maire, secretary general of the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor]. In very similar terms, both denounced the resurgence of "the old demons of nationalism and xenophobia" in their closest neighbor. Political parlance has suddenly deteriorated into "historical" invective, as if to express a new spasm of painful discord in the national consciousness and France's memory.

This should not surprise us, because the history of French nationalism with its partisan ambivalences, conflicting ideological reference, tangled currents of opinion, is, in fact, a prefiguration of the current confusion plaguing all political families confronted by an unprecedented crisis.

After Napoleon's downfall, a strong current flowed throughout the 19th century until it emptied into the Sedan basin in 1870: it was a nationalism of expansion and revolutionary expectations, and it constituted the "leftist" opposition to the Restoration and the July Monarchy. As the ideological heir of the French Revolution, this nationalism retained swaggering Jacobinism's flag-waving chauvinism and humanitarian messianism. Michelet was its poet. A trace of it reappeared in the Parisian mobs of the Commune and in Jules Ferry's colonial imperialism. The defeat of 1871 gave rise to a second strong current, namely the nationalism of amputated territory and revenge. Gambetta was its spontaneous expression, Renan its moralist.

Some 20 years later, it was a new episode: Boulangists [supporters of General Boulanger] accused the "opportunistic" Republic of "failure" and "betrayal." Originating in the radical left, this nationalism oscillated for a time and then settled down in the extreme right. It was an antiparliamentary and counterrevolutionary nationalism of withdrawal and denounced

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both the "barbarians" and the "anti-France." Above all, it was associated with much philosophizing about decadence. This philosophizing produced such writers as Deroulede, Drumont, and Maurras. Barres, the novelist of the uprooted, was the poet of this nationalism.

While avowed nationalism had shifted and entrenched itself within the right, it did reappear within the left when the communist party of Thorez readopted the Jacobin tradition in 1934 and L'HUMANITE stopped publishing its anti-militarist column. It was an on-again off-again nationalism depending upon the requirements of Soviet policy. But fecundated by the Resistance, it became truly a people's nationalism in which we find again the two components of the first strong nationalist current, its chauvinism and its internationalism, not to mention a virulence of tone comparable to the most excoriative excommunications by extreme rightist groups.

De Gaulle, an officer philosopher born with the Boulangist movement, had formed--by sentiment as much as by reason--"a certain idea of France." His "idea" represented a mixture of all the superimposed trends of French nationalism. His language was literally the language of both Michelet and Barres. His pantheon excluded neither the left nor the right. "There is only one," he said in describing the history of France as the most outstanding mentor of the national heart and soul. Raoul Girardet, an observer of French nationalism, distinguishes, in the common underlying vein of its various misfortunes, a dual nostalgia of grandeur and unity: two characteristics that correspond to the continuous decline of France's international influence and the almost constant political instability since the Revolution. De Gaulle, however, performed the clearly anachronistic miracle of gratifying this dual nostalgia--exorcised as much as exalted--by personally assuming and exercising political power. By gaining popular consent largely based on foreign policy, defense, and institutions, he eventually dispelled, not without some difficulty, the old haunting memories of a humiliated country and partitioned national territory.

Some 10 years after the General's resignation, his real "orphans" appear to be those abandoned by French nationalism. Among certain Gaullists, and among communists too, we see revival of a provocative vocabulary typical of the nationalism of opposition: the RPR [Rally for the Republic] is starting to talk like the RPF [Rally of the French People] under the Fourth Republic, and the PCF has rediscovered the language of its earlier isolation period.

Yet this simplistic observation must not mask a more subtle reshuffling of the cards of nationalism. Now that nobody any longer believes in the German menace which was responsible for the century-long heyday of French nationalism, its substitutes have become denationalized: along with the entire right, the Gaullist troop is primarily afraid of world communism. Along with the entire left, the communist troop is primarily afraid of multinational corporations. Where defense of our independence is concerned, each of the four major political families considers itself the one most capable of providing such defense.

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Under such scattered conditions, how can anyone trace the possible paths contemporary nationalism might take? The RPR path is blocked by two obstacles: the legitimate government instituted by Gaullism itself, and the inability, inherited from the General, of actually generating strong popular motivation for a national grand design. Then there is a vast following--almost as heterogeneous as the Socialist Party's following--wavering between its joint responsibilities as part of the parliamentary majority and its nostalgia of national cohesion it emotionally identifies with the unity of the Rally.

Language and Soil

If a nationalist type reaction were to develop within the RPR and its followers, it does seem that it would be expressed around two main themes: national decline and the collapse of collective discipline under buffeting by the crisis. Jacques Chirac noted that "national feelings are asserting themselves everywhere and peoples are seeking their identity in their history, their, language, and their soil." This is a revival of the age-old theme of the uprooted.

The same process of "destructuralizing" or hastily "restructuring" French society could produce a nationalist eruption on the left. Jean-Pierre Chevenement of the CERES [Center for Socialist Studies, Research, and Education], speaking in the "rebellious" tradition of the socialist family that some years ago opposed the CED [European Defense Community], admitted: "If fighting against industrial dismantlement and for the country's right to live is the mark of nationalism, then yes we are nationalist." And Charles Fiterman analyzing, as a communist, France's decline, charged: "The strategy of the big capitalistic interests and the Giscardian government is preparing France to become a dependent, subcontracting, and underdeveloped country during the third millenium." What is taking shape, therefore, is a possible shift toward a clearly Third World type of nationalism identifying economic and social protest with the revolt against multinational corporations. A "Mountain" [extreme party, French Revolution] theme stemming from an unprecedented situation in France, namely underdevelopment.

One of the chief of state's lieutenants, Michel d'Ornano, proclaimed: "The expression of the only true nationalism is internal unity in the defense of the country's interests throughout the world."

Unfortunately, this "reasonable" formula does not cover the real anguish expressed throughout the ages by a nation that is much less self-confident than it cares to admit, a nation that frequently imagines itself about to be subjugated.

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Poll Questions and Answers

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 10 Feb 79 pp 64-67

[Poll conducted in France 18-24 January by Institut Louis Harris-France]

[Text] Question 1: Being French

If you were asked to describe yourself by two or three characteristics, which of the following would you select as most important?*

The fact of being French	60 percent
Your age	38
Your occupation	35
Your social class	31
Your sex	24
Your religion	13
Your race	8
Do not know	7

*Total exceeds 100 percent because of multiple answers.

The importance of a person's sex was particularly pronounced among women: 32 percent versus 15 percent for men. Among 18-24 year olds, age (53 percent) prevailed over nationality (44 percent). Among 25-34 year olds, occupation (47 percent) was nearly as important as nationality (48 percent). Occupation was also highly important to farmers (64 percent). The fact of being French was less important to senior executives and the liberal professions (48 percent) and also to middle-level supervisory personnel and white-collar workers (45 percent) than to other persons polled. Political affiliation had little influence: communists did consider social class especially important: 47 percent versus 48 percent for nationality. Nationality was highly valued by UDF (71 percent) and RPR (79 percent) members.

Question 2: What is France?

Which of the following terms seem to best characterize France in your opinion?*

Liberty	61 percent
Tolerance	33
Generosity	29
Chauvinism	24
Equality	17
Pretentiousness	13
Grandeur	12
Improvisation	11
Sense of proportion	5
Pettiness	5
Futility	4
Imperialism	4
Do not know	5

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*The total exceeds 100 percent because of multiple answers. The total of the six qualities was 157 percent, of the six defects 61 percent.

Liberty was selected by only 46 percent of the 18-24 year olds and 38 percent of the communists. Tolerance was a characteristic for only 21 percent of the 18-24 year olds and 24 percent of the 25-34 year olds, and for only 24 percent of the senior executives and 25 percent of the communists. Liberty (80 percent) tolerance (41 percent), and generosity (44 percent) were particularly mentioned by UDF members. Chauvinism was admitted primarily by the young--35 percent among the 18-24 year olds and 31 percent among the 25-34 year olds--and by senior executives (44 percent) and middle-level supervisory personnel (33 percent). Improvisation was an essential characteristic for 21 percent of management personnel and the liberal professions.

Question 3: Threats to France

Some persons claim France is threatened. In your opinion, by whom or by what is France mainly threatened?*

Communism	20 percent
Third World population growth	19
Arabs	17
Multinational corporations	16
Russians	15
Chinese	14
Regional separatism	10
Supranational Europe	7
Americans	4
Germans	3
Socialism	2
Jews	2
Do not know	27

*Total exceeds 100 percent because of multiple answers.

Party affiliation was the determining factor: Communism (40 percent) and the Arabs (27 percent) are especially feared by RPR members: communism (35 percent) and the Russians (25 percent) by UDF members. Socialists were close to the general average but particularly feared the threat posed by multinational corporations (21 percent) and had less misgivings about communism (13 percent). For the communists, the relative order of the threats was inverted: multinational corporations (32 percent), supranational Europe (21 percent), the Americans (16 percent), and the Arabs (16 percent). It should be noted that the threat of the multinational corporations was stressed by senior executives (19 percent) and middle-level supervisory personnel (22 percent), and that the Arab threat was particularly felt by farmers (23 percent) and blue-collar workers (21 percent).

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Question 4: France's Friends

What country or countries do you consider France's best friend (s)?*

West Germany	33 percent
United States	22
Belgium	20
Great Britain	16
Italy	8
A county of Black Africa	8
Spain	7
Luxembourg	7
The Netherlands	6
Switzerland	5
Other countries including China (3 percent) and USSR (2 percent)	27
Do not know	37

*Total exceeds 100 percent because of multiple answers.

West Germany was less esteemed by women (27 percent), the elderly (27 percent), and communists (19 percent) than by others. The United States was particularly esteemed by senior executives and the liberal professions (29 percent) and by RPR members (30 percent). It was not well considered by communists (14 percent), although only 6 percent of the latter indicated the USSR and 5 percent China. The 18-24 year olds (23 percent) and RPR members (25 percent) more often cited Great Britain than did the others.

Question 5: National Symbols

Do you think the national symbols--La Marseillais, the 14th of July, and the tricolor flag--are somewhat old-fashioned, or on the contrary, are they still as important as in the past?

As important as in the past	56 percent
Are somewhat old-fashioned	39
Do not know	5

The 18-24 year olds (47 percent) and the socialists (48 percent) were those least attached to these symbols.

Question 6: France's Status

A. Do you believe that at the present time and from the standpoint of its technical achievements

France holds a respectably average position?	74 percent
France is one of the world's leading countries?	12
France lags far behind?	10
Do not know	4

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B. From a cultural standpoint, would you say that at the present time

France holds a respectably average position?	65 percent
France is one of the world's leading countries?	22
France lags far behind?	8
Do not know	5

Question 7: France's Prestige

What do you think of the view that France's prestige in the world has been steadily declining for a certain number of years?

I totally agree with that view	11)	
I somewhat agree with that view	33)	44 percent
I totally disagree with that view	32)	
I would rather tend to disagree	14)	46 percent
Have no opinion		10 percent

Among those "totally" or "somewhat" agreeing that France is declining: 18-24 year olds (52 percent), blue-collar workers (51 percent), communists (62 percent), and socialists (56 percent). Among those denying any such decline: persons over 65 (52 percent), senior executives (51 percent), UDF members (69 percent) and RPR members (57 percent).

Question 8: Major Future Tasks

In your opinion, which one of the following major tasks should future generations of French youth apply themselves to on a priority basis?

Transforming relations between men and nations	32 percent
Helping underdeveloped countries	19
Building Europe	12
Accelerating scientific and technical progress	10
Building socialism	9
Expanding the liberal society	8
Do not know	10

Communists favored the building of socialism (31 percent) over "transformation of relations" (23 percent). Oddly enough, it was among RPR members that the building of Europe received its best score (25 percent).

Question 9: Atomic Weapons

In your opinion, must [France's] atomic weapons be used solely to defend French national territory, or must France use them also to defend its allies in the event of aggression against their territories?

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Defend French national territory	45 percent
Be used also to defend territories of its allies in the event of aggression	26 percent
Do not know	29 percent

Slightly more communists (48 percent) and RPR members (52 percent) than the others would limit employment of atomic weapons to defense of the national territory.

Question 10: Who Defends France's National Independence?

A. Which of the following political parties do you consider most devoted to defending France's national independence?*

Communist Party (PCF)	18 percent
Socialist Party (PS)	31
Union for French Democracy (UDF)	23
Rally for the Republic (RPR)	31
Do not know	27

*Total exceeds 100 percent because of multiple answers.

Communists massively chose the PCF (74 percent), socialists the PS (62 percent), and RPR members the RPR (75 percent). Only the Giscardians split their vote between the UDF (55 percent) and the RPR (41 percent). The PCF obtained its best "independence rating" among the 18-24 year olds (26 percent). The PS headed the list among middle-level supervisory personnel (36 percent) and blue-collar workers (32 percent). The RPR topped the list among senior executives (50 percent), farmers (35 percent), and small shopkeepers (35 percent).

B. Which of the following social classes do you consider most devoted to defending France's national independence at any cost?*

Ruling class ("Grande bourgeoisie")	17 percent
Working class	37
Middle class	38
Rural class ("Peasantry")	25
Do not know	18

*Total exceeds 100 percent because of multiple answers.

Each social-occupational category awarded itself the "palm of independence": farmers (43 percent) to the rural class; small shopkeepers and craftsmen (45 percent), middle-level supervisory personnel and white-collar workers (37 percent) to the middle class; and blue-collar workers (53 percent) to the working class. Sole exception: senior executives and the liberal professions were 40 percent for the middle class, 34 percent for the rural class, and only 27 percent for the ruling class, a class to which they probably feel they do not belong.

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Political corollary of the above: communists (65 percent) and socialists (42 percent) designated the working class; UDF (50 percent) and RPR members (54 percent) chose the middle class. More PS members (20 percent) than UDF members (19 percent) chose the ruling class.

Question 11: Five Opinions

Here are a few opinions we have heard expressed. For each one of them, can you tell us whether you rather agree or rather disagree?

	Rather agree %	Rather disagree %	Do not know %
In the world, there will always be superior nations and subordinate nations, and in the interest of all, the superior nations are the ones who should direct world affairs.	35	54	11
What does France's political power matter: its real strength lies in the fact that it has made possible the works of great writers, scientists, scholars, and artists, and continues to do so.	63	21	16
France is overrun with undesirable foreigners it in no way needs. It would be better to send them back home.	50	38	12
The 50-64 year olds (59 percent), the over-65 (56 percent), the inactive and retired (57 percent), blue-collar workers (56 percent), RPR members (59 percent), and socialists (54 percent) were those who "agreed" the most. The 25-34 year olds (49 percent), senior executives (62 percent), white-collar workers and middle-level supervisory personnel (50 percent), and the communists (51 percent) were those who "agreed" the least.			
A French blue-collar worker resembles a blue-collar worker in another country more than a French employer	59	21	20
One of France's great assets is the French language. It is a language of culture that is spoken in vast regions of the world	67	20	13

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Poll Conclusions

Par's L'EXPRESS in French 10 Feb 79 pp 67-68

[Article by Albert du Roy: "A Poll That Runs Counter to the Political Parties"]

[Text] Frenchmen--men or women, young or old, cabinet ministers or street sweepers--are conscious above all of being French. The national community is their primary family, the principal term in their description of themselves (see Question 1).

This first piece of information obtained from the poll conducted for L'EXPRESS between 18 and 24 January by the Institut Louis Harris-France among a sample of 1,000 persons, is less commonplace than it appears to be. Analysis of the "breakdown" of answers by sex, age, etc. reveals four basic facts:

- a. Twice as many women as men described themselves by their sex. This is evidently the result of the women's liberation movement.
- b. Twice as many 18-24 year olds than all other age groups cited their age. This is a specific characteristic of youth.
- c. Some 64 percent of the farmers--nearly double the average--described themselves by their occupation. What vocational activity conditions a person's life more than the rural occupations?
- d. Many more communists than others cited social class, around which all communist militant activity is organized.

In other words, the persons polled chose as characteristic of themselves that particular domain in which they "invest" the most. Their energy, their faith, their life. Consequently, when they select "the fact of being French" as the foremost of these characteristics, such selection is not insignificant at a time when a major debate on such themes as nation, independence, and solidarity is getting underway.

This recognition of nationality is, moreover, quite understandable in that the nation is a wonderful country (see Question 2). This second question has to do with France's characteristics: six qualities and six defects, all carefully mixed. Frenchmen proudly chose the positive qualities: France is a land of liberty, tolerance, generosity, equality, etc. A person has to be a senior executive, and hence speak from experience, to note a certain tendency to improvise. A person has to be young, and think he can do anything he likes, to accuse France of pettiness. A person has to be a communist to accuse France of imperialism and fail to recognize that liberty is France's distinguishing characteristic.

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After having designated the qualities three times more often than the defects, it was difficult not to acknowledge a certain degree of chauvinism!

Yet Frenchmen are less jingoistic than some would have us believe. Most of them do not consider their country one of the world leaders in either technical or cultural achievements, but believe that it is respectably middling (see Question 6). The majority even admitted a decline in France's prestige (see Question 7). This admission was, however, the subject of politically-oriented disagreement: RPR and UDF members denied any such decline.

"Paragons" and "Exploiters"

Party affiliations also influenced assessment of the threats to France (see Question 3). These affiliations and their influence were, in contrast, curiously confused when it came to designating France's friends (see Question 4).

In designating the threats, communists replied exactly as expected of them. Twice as many communists as the average cited the multinational corporations; three times as many a supranational Europe and four times as many the Americans. One-third less communists than the average cited the Russians and, naturally, one-tenth less cited communism.

On the other hand, when asked to name France's friends, the communists were much more confused. Even though they mentioned Germany and the United States less frequently than other persons polled, they also considered these two countries as France's best friends. Even though the USSR, China, and East European countries scored less poorly among the communists, these countries were only slightly mentioned. Combined, they received less points than Germany alone.

Now in all polls, the communists are those who less frequently refuse to answer the questions: their ideology almost always furnishes them "pat and ready-made answers." Yet 45 percent of them refused to answer this question. Do we need any further proof that communists can no longer very easily distinguish between the "good" and the "bad" countries, between the "paragons" and the "exploiters?"

In designating threats or friends, RPR members, unlike the communists, had no hesitations. They had the least number of "do not know's" on these two questions. This does not mean that clarity reigns among RPR members. A supranational Europe was deemed a threat by only 9 percent of Chirac's supporters. And they were the most numerous of all to designate Germany, Great Britain, and the United States as friends. Yet these are the three countries with whom Gaullists have most often been--and still are--at loggerheads.

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Another proof of the gap between the RPR's official positions and its potential electorate is that the latter most frequently selected "building Europe"--25 percent compared with the average 12 percent--as one of the major tasks for coming generations (see Question 8).

The PS and UDF are plagued with less contradictions than the PCF and RPR. In designating threats and friends, PS members were highly consistent with the national average; as they were, in fact for almost all their answers to the poll. As for UDF members, they were nearly obsessed by the danger of communism--35 percent versus an average of 20 percent--and by the Russians--25 percent versus 15 percent--but in no way sensitive to the threat posed by multinational corporations: 6 percent versus an average 16 percent. No greater consistency can be imagined between the electorate and the party line.

Inconsistencies and Ambiguity

Electorally speaking, Question 10, "Who defends France's national independence?" contains a few lessons which the parties can draw some benefit.

The RPR profited by the "hardening" of Chirac's position on Europe. But the PS was in no way hurt by its pro-European image. Though the two parties have conflicting positions, both were considered the prime defenders of independence.

On the other hand, the PCF, with the bottom rating, profited by neither its efforts to dissociate itself from the Soviet Union--in the view of many people, it is still the real "foreigner's party"--nor its inflammatory statements against a supranational Europe.

The UDF's situation is more difficult to assess: while each person in the other political families designated his own party as the best defender of independence, UDF members awarded their independence rating nearly as much to the RPR as to the UDF. Perhaps because in that particular electorate, the term "national independence" is ambiguous, signifying patriotic virtue and political necessity, but also a symbol of a certain exasperating addiction to the past. UDF members who believe in the term's positive meaning probably designated the UDF, while those who define it by its negative value no doubt preferred to leave the monopoly of that value to the RPR.

Agitation, inconsistencies, ambiguity: from now until 10 June, political leaders, no matter who they are, will find the issue of national independence a most ticklish one to handle.

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FRANCE

CFDT'S MAIRE INTERVIEWED ON INDUSTRIAL STRIFE

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 19 Feb 79 pp 28-30

[Interview with Edmond Maire, head of the French Democratic Confederation of Labor (CFDT), by Claude-Francois Jullien and Lucien Rioux; date and place not given]

[Text] The entire French iron and steel industry complied on Friday 16 February with the strike call issued by the five major metallurgical labor federations. This massive, powerful, and determined strike to save the regions of the North and Lorraine heralds a revolt. A revolt that is spreading and which the President of the Republic, at his press conference last Thursday, thought it advisable to say he "understood." There is labor unrest in the shipyards of the Loire Atlantique region and Marseille. The automobile industry in La Rochelle is also affected. Manufrance is desperately struggling to survive. Firemen are demonstrating throughout France and clashing with police. The time has come for labor unions to readjust to current conditions. Edmond Maire explains why in the following interview given LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR.

[Question] A few weeks ago, you were engaged in a bitter controversy with the French Communist Party and the CGT [General Confederation of Labor]. Today, however, the CFDT and Georges Seguy's confederation [CGT] are once again conducting combined operations.

[Answer] We carried on that controversy because it was necessary. Labor union action was in danger of going awry. We had to react quickly and vigorously against the upsurge of nationalism, against the exploitation of an old undercurrent of anti-German feeling that still subsists, particularly in Lorraine. We were right in doing what we did. Because now in the CGT--and indeed in the PCF too--members are changing their attitude, reverting to a saner view of labor union action, and refusing to set French workers

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against German workers. But in the background there is still a de facto conjunction between the PCF and the RPR [Rally for the Republic] in their respective efforts to oppose Giscard's policy and weaken the PS [Socialist Party], and in their refusal to give their respective strategies a European dimension.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] It's obvious that they consider it more profitable, electorally speaking, to indulge national feelings. And furthermore, the communists have a very restrictive conception of the workers Europe. Their total rejection of the Social Democrats as potential allies means that in the communist view the workers Europe includes only the communists in Great Britain, West Germany, and the Benelux countries, in addition to French and Italian communists, in other words, not very many people.

[Question] Could this objective coalition between the PCF and RPR develop to such a point as to provoke a serious governmental crisis?

[Answer] I will not make any prognoses, but I cannot see what beneficial effect a crisis triggered by such a coalition could possibly produce. As much as we favor a leftist alternative, we are still opposed to any type of "coalition of the noes" that has no principles, no prospects.

[Question] Doesn't it seem strange to you for the PCF to prefer an alliance with Cirac than with Berlinguer and Carrillo?

[Answer] When the PCF finally decided not to adopt the principles of Eurocommunism, it did so probably because it felt that would have placed its party in a position of weakness relative to the PS from which it would not be sufficiently distinct. What the communists are now trying to do is regain the advantage by combating their socialist rivals on altogether different grounds.

[Question] The PCF attacked you quite harshly. Did you not feel you were all alone?

[Answer] You are no doubt referring to the silence of the PS. There's no denying the PS did not sense as much as we did the danger of nationalism in business and industrial enterprises. Besides, the nearness of the European elections prompts it to take a cautious attitude. At any rate, the CFDT realizes that when it is a matter of taking issue, in labor circles, with certain PCF views, it is the only organization capable of doing this.

[Question] You are not surprised, therefore, by the PS leadership's concurrence in the PCF's positions, notably as concerns the iron and steel industry?

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[Answer] I am not fully familiar with the positions expressed by Francois Mitterrand on this subject. But generally speaking, there are two opposing positions.

One position holds that consumption should keep pace with production. France can produce 33 million tons of steel but consume only 23 million tons: what can be done to increase consumption and absorb this 10-million ton surplus? As if production and consumption were ends in themselves.

The other position, ours, holds that production should keep pace with needs. Hence we say: What are the real needs in France? What must be done to satisfy those needs? This means we reject the government's argument whereby steel production must be reduced as much as possible, to such an extent that it would be quite insufficient in the event of economic recovery. In our opinion, enough production must be maintained in France to permit economic development and ensure our country's self-sufficiency in this respect. But neither do we ignore the changing international market and the establishment of steel production complexes in developing countries. If, after thorough consultation between labor unions and the government, it is acknowledged that there is indeed overproduction, facilities must first be converted to production of those grades of steel of which we have a shortage, and then steel-consuming industries must be established in those sectors where national production is inadequate and where the needs of developing countries are enormous: machine tools and durable goods. This ought to be enough to safeguard jobs and save the threatened regions. If such action were to still prove inadequate, then it would be necessary to install other replacement activities, create other industrial jobs, and also establish services to carry out the personnel transfers that would appear to be inevitable.

[Question] Are you not in a precarious position when, in Lorraine, you engage in joint actions with the CGT who rejects the very approach you have just described as yours?

[Answer] We have two basic points in common: refusal to allow steelworkers to become jobless and the desire to reduce the workweek. Where we differ is in our conceptions of how the French society should develop. The CFDT holds that there has to be a strong French steel industry. But for us, progress is not automatically identified with the number of additional kilograms of steel consumed per capita.

[Question] Violence is beginning to appear in labor's militant activities. Doesn't this worry you? Are you not afraid that labor unions may not be able to keep their rank and file in line?

[Answer] What is primarily appearing is a veritable revival of workers combativity. We had been expecting this for a long time. The hope of an election victory in March 1978 and then the apathy in the wake of the left's defeat checked that revival. Anger is mounting and becoming a mass

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phenomenon. Barre and Ceyrac are now reaping what they have sown. Our problem is to get beyond the stage of manifest massive refusal and open a way out of the strife, compel the government to back down on the length of the workweek and the creation of jobs.

[Question] Aren't you being somewhat autocritical? Even before the left's election defeat, you advocated a "recentering" of the CFDT, in other words, a return to negotiations. But your negotiations have fizzled out.

[Answer] That's true. National negotiations have produced little result on the issue of low wages and none thus far on length of the workweek or unemployment benefits. Last year, we prematurely had faith in our expanded action. We had also believed that employers would realize it was in their medium-term interest to raise the lower wages--if only to give consumer industries a boost--and reduce the workweek to avoid outbursts of despair. Now it is clear that by their strategy of ruthless liberalism, employers and the Giscard-Barre government actually acted as ultraconservatives.

This has not made us alter our course; however. We are keeping the same goals. And if there is mounting pressure to obtain negotiations, it is perhaps because our action policy has been able to avoid futile and useless days of protest.

[Question] But in that case, actually what do you mean by the word "recentering?"

[Answer] It means shifting from a political approach to a labor union approach. It means seeking to obtain results through mass action, results not dependent on a new political majority's entry into the government. It means no longer relying on a coalition of parties to promote change but making militant social and labor action the prime mover of this change. For that matter, a few months later, the CGT--at its Grenoble congress--partially adopted our approach. Georges Seguy admitted that his union's approach had been too abstract, too general. To us that translates into "too political."

[Question] Do you really believe in this change by the CGT in Grenoble? Judging from some of your public statements, we could doubt it.

[Answer] The CGT leadership said some courageous things in Grenoble. It is true, however, that Georges Seguy's statements were not really new. He had previously made them at the CGT metallurgical workers congress in 1971. Back then, he said: "We have to democratize, create a dynamic for the debate." In the years that followed, nothing was done to implement that statement. Consequently we had every reason to be suspicious and could have asserted that Grenoble in no way changed the CGT's real nature. Upon reflection and after discussion, we took the opposite gamble.

Let it be thoroughly understood: we believe the order for a successful in-depth change in the CGT are slim. We know how strong the communists are in

that union. but there is also a debate among those communists. Ever since the Grenoble congress, CGT members are no longer speaking with but one voice. What we do fear is that this debate will end and communist CGT members will again be taken in hand by their party. If the PCF withd-aws within itself, goes it alone to recapture its voter support and weaken the PS, and hence revert to sectarianism, well then it will be difficult for the CGT to implement the policy lines it adopted in Grenoble.

[Question] The CGT's "number one man" and "number two man"--Seguy and Krasucki, to name names--have different views. Even though Seguy is a member of the PCF's political bureau, he does appear to be the man who favors a more liberal and open approach.

[Answer] Frankly I don't know a thing about the political bureau's internal debates, nor about those within the CGT's confederal bureau.

[Question] Nevertheless you do at times make distinctions between members of the CGT's confederal bureau. For instance, in June 1978, after Jean-Louis Moynot, CGT secretary, had released a statement that was almost an auto-criticism of his union's action, you told the CGT delegation: "If you concur in Moynot's statement, then we can talk."

[Answer] I did not say it in such a provocative way. What I did say in effect was: "We have been wondering about certain things. So have you, and what Moynot has just written is proof of this. His thoughts are in line with what we are trying to do."

[Question] When you reluctantly engage in united action, are you not strengthening the position of CGT's "hardliners?"

[Answer] By rejecting "catch-all" days of protest, we are not thereby refusing to engage in united action. That is a false interpretation. Totally false. Our organizations on all sides are recommending united action.

But we do not want this unity to suppress the debate. The fundamental problem facing our two organizations is the inadequacy of the labor movement's responses, and in a broader sense, the inadequacy of the response of the working classes to the crisis. We believe we do have some ways and means of responding: adoption of a new type of development in which workers and groups acquire greater autonomy enabling them to be responsible for necessary changes; direct labor movement involvement in such new social conflicts as the feminist movement, the ecological movement, the "antiproductionist" movement, etc. Such is our future course of action.

It is not always easy to translate this into terms of immediate protest or or response to a specific industrial policy. If the CGT is pondering the same issues, if it is beginning to realize that a fancy "common program" is not sufficient to solve the deep-rooted problems of French society, well

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then we shall be able to move forward together. This is why we advocate united action. Not solely for tactical reasons. Because we do not want any recurrence of the March 1978 defeat. An election defeat, to be sure, but above all the defeat of a strategy of change. Having said this, I am not sure the CGT has taken the same unitary approach we have. Some of its members may possibly still think a renovated CGT, a CGT for all, is the best solution.

[Question] The journalist Rene Andrieu recently accused the CFDT of being the Socialist Party's "messenger boy." Admittedly you objected sharply to this, but exactly what are your relations with the PS?

[Answer] Very infrequent. There has been no meeting between the governing bodies ("bureaus") of the CFDT and PS for over a year. Nor with other parties for that matter. On the other hand, there are normal and frequent contacts during the parliamentary debates on issues of current interest.

But let's talk about the Socialist Party. When labor union comrades speak derisively about the Socialist Party's current debate--they call them personality problems, internal problems--I disagree with them. I find this unfair. We need political parties to help us transform society. But we do say these parties need to change. How could they possibly do this without debates? The French Communist Party's discussion with its intellectuals, the Socialist Party's internal discussion are all positive developments. We do not find fault with such discussions.

The fact remains, however, that these debates do seem quite far-fetched and seem designed to select political leaders and key officials for a future government more than to define an action policy that attempts to provide solutions to the problems of everyday life here and now.

[Question] Your understanding with Jacques Chereque, secretary general of the CFDT's Metallurgical Workers Federation--a man currently denounced as a rightist--has made you the target of cross fire from the PCF and certain wings of the PS.

[Answer] There are, in France, young fellows on the left or extreme left who blame the CFDT for everything. And with good reason. Just imagine, if in 1979 mass movements are able to get Barre to back down and compel employers to really negotiate, these young lads will no longer have a part to play. They claim everything is accomplished through politics, through elections or the politico-intellectual avant-garde, in other words through them. And the labor movement, militant mass actions would prove to them that the opposite is true. Isn't that intolerable?

[Question] Could we talk a bit about Europe? It too is in the future.

[Answer] Let me tell you how I believe Europe influences our labor union action policy.

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Let us start with the facts and recent economic history: Europe is so socially and economically intertwined that there can be no lasting great disparity between the wage situation in one given country and other neighboring countries, even if Europe protects itself and becomes an entity capable of autonomous action, which is our course of action. If one single country achieves a series of massive social advancements without having these improvements exert an influence on neighboring countries, that one country would evidently become less competitive. Its exports are going to decline, its imports increase. What is the answer to this problem? For the communists, the answer is simple: competitiveness is an employer's concept. The communists hide behind the denial of certain current factors of competitiveness--exploitation of workers, submission to an international distribution of labor controlled by the dominant capitalist forces--to reject the necessity of being competitive. They want to ignore the fact that even when we have established workers control of labor, our country will have to be able to export to the same extent it imports if it does not wish to become isolated and dependent.

In their post-September 1977 thinking, communists hold that if we find ourselves faced with foreign competition, with competitiveness, we protect ourselves against this by raising tariff walls. This simplistic reasoning finesses on the fact that such protective measures inevitably bring on retaliatory measures. The outcome is the closing of borders. But as we export 40 percent of our industrial production, halting this flow of trade would be disastrous. Refusal to accept competitiveness means exacerbation of our unemployment.

We do not in any way draw from these established facts the same conclusion Bergeron drew from them in a recent interview given LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR. As I understand it, he said: the 35-hour workweek can be obtained in Europe only all together or not at all. Such reasoning leads to immobilism. In contrast, German steel workers have showed us the way. They began by fighting for the 35-hour week in one specific sector. They were not successful but did obtain some partial results. And their example is enriching. Our goal is to create a real community of militant action, to have any social advance made in one country produce a sort of "domino" effect in neighboring countries, and to combine national actions and European actions, national solutions and European solutions.

This then is our approach on Europe. It is also why we support the enlargement of Europe. Present-day barriers make it more difficult to incorporate Greek, Portuguese, and Spanish workers in this collective militant action.

[Question] The CGT apparently does not fully agree with the PCF on this point, on the enlargement of Europe.

[Answer] Nor does it disagree. It has a more circumspect position. In this kind of situation, the CGT's attempt to maintain a certain degree of

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independence--or rather its desire to show that it listens to its minority-- prompts it to do nothing instead of making an effort to reconcile the different currents of opinion within its organization.

[Question] And yet you seem reluctant to say the PCF has in fact again taken the CGT in hand...

[Answer] You would like to have me tell you that, wouldn't you? Some CFDT members exposed to the negative attitudes or attacks of a few CGT members may perhaps get to the point of saying: it's all over, the Grenoble congress has vanished. We cannot say that today, even though it definitely does seem that the small patch of blue sky will have difficulty expanding. We will do our utmost to help it expand as much as possible. There have been some difficulties. And there will be more. We must overcome them. We must act in such a way that a dynamic of resurgence can develop. This is more important than our small routine labor union problems. Furthermore, we would not be in the CFDT if we allowed our organizational interests to take precedence over the interest of the workers movement. If we were to act differently, we would have to change union!

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FRANCE

BRIEFS

SUPER ETENDARD CONSTRUCTION--At present, 13 Super Etendard aircraft are finished or in the final stages of construction at the Toulouse plant of the Dassault company; 5 others have been delivered to Flotilla 11F at Landivisiau whose pilots have flown them more than 500 hours. Flotilla 11F should receive its 12 Super Etendard aircraft by the end of February after which Flotillas 14F at Landivisiau and 17F at Hyeres are to receive theirs in September 1979 and July 1980 respectively. [Text] [Paris LE MONITEUR DE L'AERONAUTIQUE in French Mar 79 p 7]

MIRAGE 2000 TESTS--The two prototypes of the Mirage 2000 have now flown a total of more than 130 hours and additional flight tests are still being carried out normally. Flights using 1700-liter auxiliary tanks were recently carried out; also, low-speed level flight has been attempted, with flights of 85 and 100 knots made. Above 20,000 feet, speeds in excess of Mach 2 have been achieved, with even an altitude of 50,000 feet having been exceeded. According to Dassault, no motor problems have been experienced with the M-53 motor. [Text] [Paris LE MONITEUR DE L'AERONAUTIQUE in French Mar 79 p 7]

POLICE UNION WARNING--The police unions (the Independent Federation of Police and the National Union of Police) have warned the minister of the interior that "our men will refuse to put down any demonstration organized by the unemployed." [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 9 Mar 79 p 12]

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SPAIN

BASQUE COUNTRY SUFFERS SEVERE ECONOMIC CRISIS

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 11 Feb 79 pp 20-23

[Text] A group of experts called together by the Basque General Council met on 3 and 4 February in Bilbao to study the relationship between terrorism and the economic situation.

Ramon Rubial, the chairman of the Basque General Council, was quite straightforward at the opening session of the meetings of intellectuals who took a look at the problem of violence 1 week before: "The situation is serious: employment figures are alarming, and most companies are on the brink of collapse."

Unemployment, which is above the national average, and emigration have indeed made their presence felt in the Basque Country, which for many years took in the manpower from other regions that was searching for "the promised land."

Business bankruptcies, investor fears, capital depletion, the fall of major industries and even a drop in consumption today characterize a zone that is in danger of becoming one of the country's most depressed regions, whereas it is now one of the most developed.

A high-level director of a Basque savings bank graphically summed up the situation for this magazine: "If this were a company, we would have already had to suspend payments...at the very least."

Sales Way Down

Luis Olarra, the president of the Confederation of Basque Businessmen, asserts that "there's no money at all around here anymore." Agreeing with him, Anton de Madariaga, a Nationalist and the director general of Petronor, says: "The period from January to December 1978 was historically the most pessimistic in the last 10 years."

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You need only to take to the streets to check this out; while visiting commercial establishments in a number of major Basque cities, this magazine heard dozens of pessimistic accounts.

For example, Juana Maria Echevarria, the owner of a fabric shop in San Sebastian, commented: "I sell less every day. I don't see a single customer for days sometimes. People are becoming withdrawn, not only, I think, because of the economic crisis, but also because the climate is not right for buying things."

This is more or less the view of Gorka Arazu, who sells household appliances in the outskirts of Bilbao; with a glass of wine in hand, he told CAMBIO 16: "I'm seriously thinking about moving somewhere else in Spain, and I'm Basque through and through, but the sales opportunities around here are plummeting. In my line, where installment buying predominates, no one dares sign a payment note when they don't know what's going to happen next year. What am I saying, next year, next month!"

The Tommy Gun Economy

The Basque economic crisis does not stem solely from the political situation prompted by ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] terrorist actions, but no one doubts that terrorism is a decisive factor. "And above all," an expert says, "at present it is preventing any sort of plan, any possibility of a recovery."

Carlos Solchaga, an economic expert of the Socialist Party of the Basque Country (PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party]), feels that a solution to the crisis "depends on a solution to the problem of terrorism. Resolving the latter is not enough, but it is, of course, essential."

The Spanish Communist Party (PCE) feels likewise, stating in an extensively studied economic recovery program for the Basque Country that an essential condition for implementing it is "the pacification of the country."

The reasons for the breakdown of the Basque Country are clear to the experts consulted by this magazine: in the first place, they cite the disappearance, along with the dictatorship, of the conditions that favored the industrial development of the Basque Country to a greater extent than other regions of Spain, tariff and credit facilities, etc that were possible thanks to the agreement between the Basque oligarchy and the Franco administration. It has been the Basque oligarchs who have begun the process of withdrawing capital from the zone, which used to be preferred by them.

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Secondly, there is the industrial structure of the Basque economy, which is basically designed to meet investment demands and to manufacture raw materials used in investment, which has been one of the economic areas hardest hit by the upshot of the general crisis.

In addition, the international crisis has affected the iron and steel and shipbuilding sectors, which are major pillars of the Basque economy.

EPA in Command

The most important factor at present, however, which is also preventing an economic comeback for the Basque Country, is doubtless the political instability triggered by terrorist activities.

The revolutionary tax, the kidnaping of or threats against businessmen and the EPA's involvement in a number of labor conflicts, along with its armed activities, have deepened the economic crisis and are preventing the establishment of the groundwork needed for a recovery.

"We're scared," several businessmen told CAMBIO 16, "we're scared, and that's the worst thing that can happen in economic activity."

Out of fear, no one dares invest in the Basque Country today, and those who can and want to invest select other, calmer regions. According to information gathered by this magazine, in recent months a number of Basque businessmen who have had the chance to expand their industries or to invest have chosen regions outside the Basque Country to do so.

Naturally, they have undertaken such operations with the utmost discretion, because, in the words of one of them, "the arm of the EPA is very long." Even businessmen tied to Nationalist sectors and who are, therefore, interested in their region's economic recovery, have chosen to set up shop elsewhere because it is impossible for them to secure a minimum guarantee of security in their own region.

While these developments were taking place, CAMBIO 16's correspondent in Venezuela, Ted Cordova, was monitoring the activities there of the president of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), Carlos Garaicoechea, and former deputy Xabier Arzallus, and reported that over the last 3 years over 1 billion pesetas of Basque capital has flowed into Venezuela.

Money on a Round Trip

The economic sectors in which this investment winds up are mainly metallurgy, construction and the graphic arts, where, according to Garaicoechea, "in the last 3 years at least 300 Basque industries" have been set up.

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The PNV president does not think, however, that this capital drain is due mainly to uncertainty or to the climate of violence; "rather, there has been a shift to other geographic areas. There are incentives in other countries, although, of course, we should not rule out the phenomenon of violence."

In any case, the flight of Basque capital to the other side of the Atlantic is partly a round trip: the capital that leaves the Basque Country in fear of violence and extortion returns in the form of contributions to the PNV after picking up renewed strength in the Caribbean.

The Downfall Begins

This is one of the main objectives of the trip by the Nationalist leaders on the eve of the election campaign, although it was officially portrayed "as an invitation from the Christian Democrats, the winners of the recent presidential election."

Meanwhile, the downfall has already begun; the data are there. Between June 1977 and June 1978, the Basque Country registered the smallest rise in bank deposits in all Spain. Guipuzcoa, the province hardest hit by terrorist activity, had the least growth in all Spain, with 10.92 percent, the national average being 20 percent. According to the Vizcaya Chamber of Commerce, backlog of orders and stocks were at their lowest levels in recent history.

In 1977, 648 businesses in the province of Vizcaya submitted notices of crisis, which affected more than 17,500 workers. In Guipuzcoa, 750 companies had to do the same.

A highly indicative statistic is that last year the tax index rose 3 percent in the province of Guipuzcoa, whereas it increased 11 times more, 35 percent, in Barcelona, the nationwide average being 30 percent.

National Reconstruction

Even unemployment and emigration, two almost unknown words in the Basque Country, have reared their heads. In the third quarter of 1978 the jobless level was above the national average, as 80,000 were idle in the provinces of Alava, Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa.

And since the Basque Country has changed from a promised land into a battlefield, immigration halted in 1977, and during the second half of last year emigration hit high levels, which cannot be pinpointed because of the lack of official data.

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As if that were not enough, the future outlook is not bright. Businessmen, economic experts, party leaders and people in the street agreed that "we have to immediately begin economic reconstruction, begin the recovery before we hit bottom and the breakdown becomes total."

But all of those consulted also expressed pessimism with regard to the immediate future, which none saw as moderately bright, especially as far as ending the violence is concerned.

"The worsening of the crisis," said Jose Maria Baldasano, a representative of the Bilbao stock market, "is going to cause some noticeable difficulties in getting the economy moving again." Baldasano, who recently took charge of the stock market in the Basque capital, pointed out that the number one factor in moving towards a recovery "is confidence in the future, confidence on the part of businessmen, investors and consumers."

Madrid in Command

Paradoxically, the armed activities of the ETA and the calls for independence by other groups are making the Basque Country more and more economically dependent on state resources, from Madrid in other words, and on the solidarity of the other regions of Spain.

"What used to be an important economy," says Carlos Solchaga, "is in a depression today. In my view, it is going to resemble increasingly the economy of Asturias, with major state intervention to resolve the crisis, at least in the large sectors."

The Socialist expert, who has done several studies on this topic, asserts that the ETA's policy is not only reactionary in that it runs counter to the interests of the Basque working class and the Spanish working class in general, "but also, in a fundamentally industrial society, like the Basque Country, for which economic transformations in a short space of time are enormously difficult, it also encourages an even greater integration of the Basque economy within Spain's overall economic picture."

There are already indications, in fact, that state enterprise is replacing private enterprise in the Basque Country. And this intervention will increase considerably if Basque business circles continue to hold back in view of the uncertain situation, to the extent that they endanger job posts and their own role in the market economy.

Utopian Independence

According to Solchaga, "it is a natural thing for a region to be economically dependent on the state as a whole," but the paradoxical thing is that "this doesn't mean anything to the people who are issuing Utopian calls for the economic independence of the Basque Country."

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Such an independence is becoming increasingly Utopian, in view of the real situation. This is what Madariaga, the Nationalist from the Vizcaya Chamber of Commerce, says:

"We want to act and we will act fearlessly in the face of our land's collapse. If we are able to unite and endure the necessary sacrifices, we are certain that we can halt our downfall and aggrandize the Basque Country, thus contributing to the aggrandizement of the other peoples of the state."

Thinking Behind Closed Doors

Some 20-odd Basque intellectuals, summoned by the General Council, most of them connected with the PCE and PSOE, spent 2 days in late January "reflecting" in San Sebastian on the problem of violence in the Basque Country.

Boycotted by the PNV Nationalists, the "two busy workdays" were summed up in a 2¹/₂ page final document, which a high-level member of the General Council compared to "one of those customary communiques of condemnation that parties issue."

Poor Result

The Basque General Council politician, who asked to remain anonymous in order to avoid confrontations, could not help but comment to CAMBIO 16 that "for intellectuals who spent 2 days thinking, the result is quite poor."

And poor it was: the intellectuals condemned violence in the Basque Country, taking care not to mention the ETA by name, and pointed out that it constitutes "a major obstacle to the attainment of self-government and the national construction of the Basque Country." Anticipating themselves, they had begun the document by advising that "this communique might seem hasty because it does not contain the desired nuances."

They did, however, express the nuance that "the complexity of the problem logically gives rise to different stands, which must still be taken up and discussed without dogmatic rigidity in order to thus create a greater climate of mutual tolerance."

But although the intellectuals were very careful in their final document, so as not to compromise themselves, during their discussions a number of them dared to bring up the name of the ETA.

Naturally, the working meetings were held behind closed doors, and when CAMBIO 16 asked to see the texts of the reports, we were put off and

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given vague excuses ("They still haven't been proofread."). We could not even find out exactly which intellectuals attended the meetings, as if they were almost clandestine.

France Against the ETA

Thirty-four hours after President Suarez delivered his speech at the Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, French police authorities began a roundup of Basque refugees near the Spanish border.

It was not just a coincidence; the French authorities decided to act before the Spanish president leveled harsh words before the Council of Europe against France's attitude of "protection." A number of sources told this magazine that in light of the French police operation, Suarez made some last-minute changes in some of the paragraphs in his speech.

The French police did not dilly dally. Using the list furnished by Minister Oreja to his French counterpart a few weeks ago, which CAMBIO 16 reproduced, police agents spent from 600 to 700 hours visiting homes in Bayona, San Juan de Luz, Biarritz and nearby areas in search of refugees.

The outcome was that 7 alleged ETA members were handed over to Spanish authorities, and another 13 were deported to the Alps, where they must appear in police headquarters twice a day, with the threat that if they leave the department, "they will be handed over to the Spanish authorities."

Among those already handed over to Spanish police are Francisco Martinez Apesteguia, who is thought to be connected with the death of Armed Police Chief Joaquin Imaz Pamplona, and Carlos Catalan and Francisco Garateas, who are allegedly the top ETA men in Navarra.

French police, however, were unable to detain all of the people that they wanted to, some 50 according to reliable sources, including Aya Zulaica and Txomin Iturbe. Warned several weeks prior, many refugees, and especially those closest to the military branch of the ETA, had vanished from their homes. So that all of the refugees would not vanish into thin air, the French interior minister did not give prior notice to his police in the French Basque Country, "in order to prevent leaks."

When Suarez arrived in Strasbourg, the French Foreign Ministry announced that the political refugee statute for Basques had expired, "because there is no reason for it anymore, given the democratization of the regime in Spain, the amnesty law, the adoption of a constitution and Spain's accession to the Geneva Agreement."

Meanwhile, there were demonstrations and communiques in the Spanish Basque Country condemning what were described as "typically fascist measures."

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A Sinking Ship

Anton de Madariaga, a 58-year old resident of Vizcaya who is connected with the PNV and is the director general of the Petroleos del Norte (Petronor) Refinery, was recently elected president of the Vizcaya Chamber of Commerce; he compared the Basque Country's economic situation with that of "a sinking ship."

Madariaga spoke with CAMBIO 16's Antonio Ojeda and said that peace "is necessary for an economic recovery." The Nationalist businessman felt, however, that it was a question of ending not just ETA violence "but all violence, in other words, the other violence that is occurring here as well."

This is how the conversation went:

CAMBIO 16: What is the economic situation today in the Basque Country?

Madariaga: With regard to just Vizcaya, which is what I am most familiar with, I have to say that the social situation is bad, the economic situation is bad and the political situation is bad.

CAMBIO 16: What are the reasons?

Madariaga: I think that the situation has worsened as a result of the economic crisis that Europe in general has been suffering in recent years. We have to look for the reasons for this bad economic, social and political situation in what happened many, many years ago, I would say 40 years ago, but longer than 40 years ago as well.

CAMBIO 16: Does a solution of the economic problem depend on a solution to the ETA problem?

Madariaga: Economic problems are almost never resolved by violence. The solution to the Basque Country's problem is unity, not disunity.

CAMBIO 16: You have mentioned that institutional violence must end as well...

Madariaga: I think that with a total democratic process the violence will undoubtedly end. With a democratization of the city halls and regional and provincial institutions, I think that we, the people, are going to feel represented, that we are participating to an extent, and then most of the social violence has to end.

CAMBIO 16: How much time is left to come up with solutions to the economic crisis?

Madariaga: When a ship is sinking, the deeper it is in the water, the harder it is to get it afloat again. I think that if we continue our current course, there might not be any solutions within 2 years.

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SPAIN

MORE DETAILS GIVEN ON MEXICAN OIL AGREEMENT

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 4 Feb 79 pp 35-36

[Text] High-level executives of American and European multinationals still do not believe that PEMEX [Mexican Petroleum], Mexico's state-run oil company, which has the world's largest potential oil reserves, has picked Spain as the "middleman for its operations in Europe."

The French minister of industry visited Mexico in mid-December to offer Lopez-Portillo southern France as a refining platform for Mexican crudes earmarked for Europe. CAMBIO 16 also learned that as the year drew to a close, PEMEX received two other offers from as many U.S. multinational corporations (one of them being Shell, which has been hard hit by the crisis in Iran) to set up operations in Rotterdam, the heart of the Eurocean market. Nevertheless, on 11 January Jorge Diaz Serrano, the director general of PEMEX, was concluding a series of negotiations in Madrid with the Commerce Ministry and CAMPSA [Leasing Company of the Petroleum Monopoly, S.A.] by virtue of which Spain had just taken the big step.

Spain, The First Customer

According to reliable sources consulted by this magazine, the groundwork for the agreement had been established last November when King Juan Carlos visited Mexico in the company of Commerce Minister Juan Antonio Garcia Diez. In early October Spain and Mexico had signed an economic pact in the fields of science, technology, mineral resources and the iron and steel sector. On 9 December, Santiago Foncillas and another high-level CAMPSA executive flew home from Mexico with a preliminary oil agreement in their pocket. They had succeeded in making Spain PEMEX's first foray abroad, and probably its last.

The Commerce Ministry had reached an agreement with PEMEX for the purchase of 5 million tons a year of Mexican oil over a 5-year period starting in 1980, which would make Spain Mexico's first European customer (Mexico will supply 18 percent of Spain's crude oil imports within 2 years). The operation involves some \$600 million dollars, and since it will be carried out under a Commerce Ministry system of quotas, Mexico will be making major purchases in Spain.

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Another side to the agreement is that PEMEX is committed to providing the Spanish monopoly with technical assistance in hydrocarbons research, which will give way, during a second phase, to joint explorations with CAMPSA in two Spanish zones: the deep waters of the Mediterranean (south of the Balears) and the continental shelf in the Bay of Biscay.

The most noteworthy section of the agreement is PEMEX's participation in Petronor refinery capital stock. The state-run Mexican company initially intends to acquire 15 percent of Petronor stock (13 billion in capital stock) by investing 2 to 2.5 billion pesetas and over time, to control one-third of the Spanish refinery. Moreover, joint investments of 20 billion pesetas are planned, to change the refinery's output pattern and to boost refinery production from 7 million tons in 1979 to 12 million over a 3-year period.

Petronor is not the only Spanish refinery with which PEMEX has dealt. Circles close to CEPISA [Spanish Petroleum Company] have told CAMBIO 16 that "we have been in contact with the Mexicans, and an agreement was not reached in the end." We should note that CEPISA was the first Spanish petroleum refining company to buy crude from Mexico. In 1978, its Tenerife refinery consumed 500,000 tons of crude, and CEPISA plans to buy 2 million tons in 1979.

PEMEX has also visited Enpetrol's Tarragona refinery, but this is more in line with its interest in working together with Spain's petrochemical industry than with the search for a refinery platform for its crude oil.

Who's Buying, Who's Selling

The agreement with Mexico means that some 5,000 jobs will be created soon in Spain, in addition to providing it with PEMEX experience and technology, a more secure supply of crude oil, access to Mexico's abundant ethylene and the chance to set up several industrial projects in this regard. To Petronor it means utilizing its facilities at 100 percent instead of 60 percent capacity, almost doubling its output of refined products. CAMPSA will take greater advantage of the intermediate benefits of the energy process by getting out of just the distribution end.

"The PEMEX deal is not completely closed," CAMPSA sources told this magazine, "because it depends on how the sale of the 15 percent is worked out. But PEMEX and all of the Petronor partners want to reach an agreement above all else."

According to Nemesio Fernandez Cuesta, the Petronor president, Basque banks and entities involved with the refinery do not want to sell their share. Reliable CAMPSA circles point out that it seems unlikely that the Basque groups will sell their shares; instead, attempts are being made to reach an agreement with Gulf so that it will initially sell 15 percent of its holdings.

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SWEDEN

ULLSTEN OPENS DOOR TO SOCIALISTS SEARCHING FOR NEW COALITION

Stockholm VECKANS AFFARER in Swedish Jan 79 p 15-17

/Article by Ake Landquist: "Ullsten's First 100 Days Went Well---Things Are Now Coming to a Head"

/Text/ Last Sunday marked exactly 100 days since Ola Ullsten became prime minister of a minority Liberal Party government. This period can be described as an extended honeymoon. He has been successful in getting most of the pending bills through Parliament, but now things are coming to a head. Ullsten will be forced to deal with many critical issues, such as energy, the aerospace industry, the confidence issue and, not least, the matter of tax adjustments, which will form the basis for upcoming contract negotiations.

It was Friday 13 October 1978 and the place was Arvfurst palace in Stockholm. On the second floor of the palace the television was turned on in Ola Ullsten's corner office, with windows facing the Opera house and the King's palace. It was a direct broadcast of the parliamentary debate concerning the election of a new prime minister.

Ola Ullsten and his two close associates Hans Bergstrom and Mats Gullers intently followed the reports. Carl Tham came in. The votes had been tabulated and the board showed: 39 for, 66 against, 215 assenting. The matter had been decided; Ola Ullsten had been elected new prime minister and the Liberal Party was now the governing party.

That was the closing vignette to a long government crisis and also the beginning of an unprecedentedly intensive work session for the Liberal Party and its leaders.

All that is now history. Ola Ullsten's corner office has been turned into a conference room and the minority government's first 100 days have come to an end. It was supposed to be a short period of daring mastery and successive compromises before the election in September 1979. The every day

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working principle of the minority Liberal Party government was to proceed as if that period would never come to an end. Such were the speculations, but that has not happened, yet.

This is the record of the party's accomplishments during the fall session of Parliament: 57 proposals were submitted, 18 of which have not yet been dealt with. Of the 39 proposals up for consideration, 30 passed without ado and three were subject to slight revisions or additions. The party only met with six parliamentary defeats.

"Fall Session Undramatic"

Prime Minister Ola Ullsten commented: "We are talking about pieces of legislation. The fall session of Parliament was actually quite undramatic. The government's proposals as a whole passed." He is particularly pleased with the passage of the shipyard legislation and the incentive package, both with only slight adjustments. "These are two important pieces of legislation as far as we are concerned," said Ola Ullsten.

The party met with the greatest opposition in trying to get support for the marginal tax legislation. At the same time, the prime minister anticipated that the tax committee will urge passage of the marginal tax reform. With respect to parliamentary opposition to other bills, Ola Ullsten said: "There is talk about marginal changes in some of the proposals, but this also happens in strong governments."

Most of the parliamentary issues have been decided in committee after consulting with the leading group in Parliament. This group, in turn, consulted with government coordinators. The party's group leader in Parliament, Bjorn Molin (chairman of the Finance Committee) summed it up: "Everything has gone better than expected for a number of reasons, but the spring session will be more complicated."

The reason for the unexpected success is principally this: Many of the proposals which were dealt with by the new government had already been prepared by the Falldin coalition. Most of the proposals passed because the three non-socialist parties formed a voting coalition. Furthermore, many of the proposals were not politically controversial. Legislative proposals often form an integral part of ongoing reform. These go through Parliament without debate.

However, the parliamentary climate is expected to become more severe this spring. Elections will be coming up in September. The other parties' resolutions will collectively form the backbone of their bid for election. The national budget will be the first item on the agenda. Members of the Liberal Party are somewhat concerned about how Parliament will deal with this issue. They are also concerned about the procedure itself.

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The trouble started while they were negotiating the economic incentive package. The Finance Committee left the final decision on the marginal tax reduction up to the Tax Committee. By virtue of a compromise with the Center Party, the proposed tax reduction was cut in half.

According to the Liberal Party plan, the package, including a marginal tax reduction of 1 billion kroner, would have provided a private consumption stimulus of 2.5 percent in 1979. According to the present plan, Ingemar Mundebo anticipates a 2.8 percent increase in private consumption. This is based on the 500-million kroner compromise. The other half billion would have meant an additional quarter percentage-point, i.e., the increase would have been more than 3 percent (providing savings remained the same).

It is easy to understand why members of the Liberal Party are not concerned about the magnitude of the compromise. Bjorn Molin "It went in the right direction. But it illustrates a weakness in the procedure." The Liberal Party advocates that more power be given to the Finance Committee in Parliament. It should have equally as much power as the Department of Budget and Finance has within the government and, together, they should determine the budget. "The problem is the concentration of power within one single committee," said Bjorn Molin.

Door Open to Social Democrats

The parties' need to establish a profile before the election will also affect other important proposals before the spring session of Parliament, like energy, industrial and regional policies, the aerospace industry and the confidence issue. But this spring the government will have more time to solidify the issues before the proposals are submitted in Parliament. Since most of the coalition government's proposals have been dealt with, the Ullsten government will have more freedom to choose which proposals it wants to deal with, i.e., the door is more open to the Social Democrats.

Due to the government crisis last fall, parliamentary work was delayed by 2 to 3 weeks. A large number of decisions had to be made in the last 10 days prior to the Christmas recess. Budget matters were also affected by the government crisis. The Minister of Economy and Budget Ingemar Mundebo: "We lost a few weeks due to the change in government. Our work was delayed because of the crisis, which upset the somewhat tight schedule we are under. We were more pressed for time. The conditions surrounding the budget were almost the same as in 1976."

Otherwise the Liberal Party has been lucky with respect to time. As far as party strategy was concerned, the government crisis came at an opportune time. The most hectic period for the new government--November and December--coincided with local elections. "Fortunately enough, the initial period of the new government coincided with decentralized party work. Otherwise, our work would have been considerably more difficult," said party secretary Gunnar Strom.

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The Liberal Party was also able to convene its annual congress as a ruling party. In Gunnar Strom's words, this also provided "maximal rewards." By the end of August party leaders had prepared their statements concerning all resolutions before congress. After that Ola Ullsten, together with Gosta Bohman and Thorbjorn Falldin, became inaccessible until after the government had been dissolved. Shortly after the new government was formed, the Liberal Party congress convened in Folkets Hus in Stockholm. Three distinguished party leaders and the newly elected prime minister were escorted to the podium, where they received great tribute. Interestingly enough, the prime minister was new to the party leadership.

The change in party leadership and being the governing party has meant an upward leap in the opinion polls for the Liberal Party. Since the beginning of the year they have gained about 6 percent in the polls. The Liberal Party now has as much support as the Conservative Party, both holding about 15 percent.

Making Its Own News

Being the governing party means that you can influence the flow of news, "Make news." This is an advantage as far as public opinion is concerned. Furthermore, the Liberal Party has an unusually large press. "The combination of being able to 'make news' and having a large press is obviously an advantage," said the head of SIFO /Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls/, Prof Hans Zetterberg.

He also maintained that the Liberal Party government embodies the political hopes of an entire generation of non-socialists. "When the coalition failed, the Liberal Party was able to convey these hopes. It is not a question of political issues or personages, just a tangible sentiment. But political sentiment can have a powerful influence on public opinion and public reaction," said Hans Zetterberg.

Ola Ullsten: "Our gain in the polls probably shows that people value a government that can do something. Action pays off in politics. But I do not assume anything based on opinion polls, but am unconditionally awaiting developments with respect to our currency."

Decisive-But Powerless

Ola Ullsten's ability to make decisions is viewed by many political analysts as perhaps his greatest asset. But his minority government only represents 39 of the 349 votes in Parliament. How does this affect the public's opinion about the government's power to act? Par-Erik Bach, political science professor: "He has made very good use of tactical maneuvers. But I do not think the government gives the impression of being especially powerful. On the other hand, it does not show signs of weakness either."

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Hans Zetterberg: "Ola Ullsten's decisive appearance is being offset by the public's impression that he is powerless because Parliament can change all his decisions. This is a paradox--a decisive, but powerless prime minister. But it is difficult to say how the voter perceives this."

After a hectic fall the Liberal Party now faces a politically difficult spring before the election campaign begins in earnest late summer. The spring program is massive. Various issues must be decided, such as traffic policies, industrial and regional policies, regulations concerning family doctors, energy, the question of church and state, forest and steel policies, taxes, the question of equality in the labor market, etc.

"This is a rather ambitious program for one government, considering we must conclude by the middle of March," said Ola Ullsten, which is obviously an understatement.

Also, the government will have to decide the merit of Volvo's agreement with Norway. Ola Ullsten: "I hope the stockholders will decide, being aware that long-term advantages may outweigh eventual short-term problems." But economic developments will overshadow other issues this spring. "The dominant issues will be prices, wages and employment," said Ingemar Mendebo. He and Ola Ullsten will discuss taxes with the other parties and labor market representatives. The result will be tax reform, which will provide the basis for future wage settlements. This will be the government's central responsibility, to create a basis for smooth contract settlements with the aid of tax policies and a low rate of inflation.

Looking Toward the Election

With the economy in balance and a number of the important bills settled, the Liberal Party figures it is well prepared for the election. Based on the government's program and the party's congressional platform for 1980, the Liberal Party has established a profile prior to the election. Thus, voters can see a connection between what the party is doing and what it plans to do.

Party election strategists want to build an image of a party that can provide a prosperous future and a political balance in the center, without resorting to non-socialist block politics or class struggles. Ola Ullsten's election message is: Balance and responsibility in the center.

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SWEDEN

INFLATION BATTLE MAY DECIDE SUCCESS OF 1979 EXPORT DRIVE

Stockholm VECKANS AFFARER in Swedish 25 Jan 79 p 5

/Text/ Odds are good that Sweden's inflation can be contained within the limit stipulated by SAF-LO/PTK. Actually, the only thing that is required is to hold inflation at the present level. But there are elements of risk. For instance, the large money supply together with the fact that prices have been held down by artificial means, i.e., via tax bills.

In order to comply with the second stipulation in the SAF-LO/PTK /Swedish Employers' Confederation-Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions/Private Industry White Collar Workers' Union/ agreement, all that is actually required is to hold the rate of inflation at its present level in 1979.


According to the stipulation, SCB's consumer price index cannot go up by more than 5 percent between December 1978 and October 1979. This is equivalent to the projected 6.1 percent increase over a 12 month period from October 1978 to October 1979. Generally speaking, this is the same rate of inflation we had last fall.

The large price increases last year came in January and February--when the consumer price index rose by 3.2 percent. During the remaining 10 months the index only went up 3.8 percent. This is equivalent to an annual rate of 4.5 percent.


However, the actual figure was less due to the small increases in some months: 0.03 percent in March, 0.1 percent in June and 0.1 percent in August. Obviously, the rate of inflation was higher last fall. During the last 4 months the consumer price index rose by 6.2 percent.

We should be able to stay within the stipulated limit, provided we can hold the rate of inflation at that level. In the government's fiscal policy Ingemar Mundebo explained that "the government is determined to stay within" the 5 percent increase in prices. But there are certain elements of risk.


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Consumer prices, percent change from the previous year




GNP growth in percent



Registered unemployment by 1,000 persons

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The second stipulation in the SAF-LO/PTK agreement means that the consumer price index can only go up a maximum of 6.1% in a twelve month period.

One is the large money supply, which could easily bring on a new wave of inflation if the supply grows too quickly. Another is the latent price increases, which are held in check by price regulations.

There is also the problem that the "actual" rate of inflation is growing faster than the rise in the consumer price index. The net price index (NPI), (i.e., the consumer price index minus indirect taxes and subsidies), was 9.5 percent higher in November than a year ago. The corresponding increase in the consumer price index was 7.6 percent. Last fall the NPI--the annual rate included--rose almost one percentage-point faster than the consumer price index.

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Therefore, much of the improvement we have seen in consumer prices is due to the fact that the government has lowered indirect taxes and/or increased subsidies. For example, the general employer tax was eliminated at the end of June. Furthermore, food subsidies were raised. All these things have helped to hold down consumer prices.

These were all justified measures to reduce inflation, no doubt. But in order to prevent further increases in the consumer price index--and thus stay within the stipulated limit--one of two things will be necessary. Either the "actual" rate of inflation, including the net price index, must be lowered and/or subsidies increased.

The net price index may be lowered a little, but beyond that the government must subsidize consumer goods.

But even if it can keep the rate of inflation within the limit set for 1979, chances are great that the situation will become worse in 1980 when our capacity has been exhausted. Mundebo also gives the reasons: a closed labor market, insufficient investments, high liquidity and normalized profits. This can lead to inflation pressures and increased wages.

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UNITED KINGDOM

PRC INTEREST IN AIRBUS NOTED DURING VARLEY VISIT

London THE FINANCIAL TIMES in English 27 Feb 79 p 44 LD

[Dispatch by John Elliott: "Chinese Interest in Airbus"]

[Text] Peking--China has expressed firm interest in buying not only the European airbus--in which the UK has a stake--but also the British aerospace type 146 four-engined feeder-liner.

This emerged yesterday at talks between Mr Eric Varley, secretary for industry, and Mr Lu Dong, China's minister responsible for aircraft.

It was also agreed that talks will continue on the possibility of selling Harrier jump-jets to China, despite the UN Government's lack of interest in formal commitments while the Vietnam invasion continues.

British aerospace is also to look into the possibility of China building parts for the 146.

China also wants Britain to buy up to 5m tonnes of coal a year, to pay for large contracts being sought by the national coal board and UK mining equipment manufactures on the construction of two big mines.

This was confirmed here by Mr Zhong Ziyun, senior vice-minister for coal.

The mines, in the Tatong area, would be the biggest in China and Britain would be asked to take half their annual 10m tonnes output either for use in the UK or to sell to other countries.

It is understood that a group of London merchant banks, led by S.G. Warburg, has organised the necessary credit. The national coal board has also prepared tenders for a coal research laboratory.

Mr Zhong Ziyun said China wanted to boost its coal production of 600m tonnes a year to 900m tonnes, by the end of 1985. Of this, 10m to 20m tonnes would be exported.

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Countries now being asked to buy coal in return for gaining mining contracts, in addition to Britain, include Yugoslavia, which is seeking work on mines designed to produce 1.5m tonnes a year, and Romania, which is chasing 8m tonnes-a-year mines.

The U.S. will also be placed in this category if, as is expected, it bids for major opencast mining work.

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UNITED KINGDOM

PRC OFFERS BARTER DEAL FOR COAL DESIGN STUDY

London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 27 Feb 79 p 4 LD

[Dispatch by Nigel Wade: "Chinese Offer Coal, Not Cash"]

[Text] China is offering to pay with coal rather than cash for a design study it wants the national coal board and a private firm to do for two mines that would be the biggest in the people's republic.

Zhong Ziyun the senior deputy minister for coal, said yesterday that China was proposing barter deals to several countries because it needed to buy a lot of foreign equipment and was short of foreign exchange.

He said negotiations with the national coal board, which is in a consortium with Powell-Duffryn, the engineering company, would need time and patience. He could not say what the value of the contract might be.

The project was discussed when the former trade secretary Mr Dell visited Peking last autumn and the consortium has since submitted design proposals.

"Coal To Sell"

The vice-minister quoted consortium representatives as saying it would be difficult for Britain to import coal but that they would like to promote the sale of Chinese coal on the international market.

In other words, China could pay the consortium with coal from the new mines, which the consortium could then sell to someone else for cash.

The two mines are planned for Tatung in Inner Mongolia, and each would have an annual production capacity of five million tons.

Zhong Ziyun said that the coal board was only being asked to do feasibility studies at this stage, but it was possible that British firms would be invited to bid for equipment contracts. Construction would be done by the Chinese, taking at least five years.

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China planned to increase its annual coal production from 600 million tons last year to 800 or 900 million tons by 1985. "To achieve this target we will need foreign help," Zhong Ziyun said.

The industry secretary Mr Varley, who is visiting Peking, is to have discussions at the coal ministry on Thursday before making an overnight train trip to Tatung.

Civil Aircraft

His discussions yesterday covered long-term prospects for selling China civil aircraft, including the airbus and the British aerospace 146 passenger aircraft which is still being built.

British Aerospace, which is also holding technical talks with China about the Harrier military jet, believes that the BA 146 could meet China's needs for feeder-line planes to replace about 50 Russian Antonovs now in use.

In a series of meetings, Mr Varley met the minister in charge of China's aircraft industry, the minister responsible for electronics, and the minister of railways.

He also paid courtesy calls on the foreign minister.

Mr Varley is to discuss shipbuilding today before travelling to Shanghai.

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WEST GERMANY

CONTROVERSY OVER ATOM WASTE STORAGE DISCUSSED

Hamburg STERN in German 8 Feb 79 pp 82-91

[Report by Kai Krueger and Wolf Perdelwitz: "Remote Controlled Loaders Sink Hot Atomic Waste Into Salt for Good"]

[Text] It sounded like a front-line report: "We are now approaching the battle for Gorleben," announced Guenter Hartkopf, state secretary at the Federal Ministry of the Interior, when he reported to SPD deputies in Bonn on the latest situation regarding the conflicts raging around the "nuclear disposal center." The battle is imminent. Test drillings above the main salt strata at the Lower Saxon border with the GDR are set to begin in February.

For the police as well as the opponents of nuclear power the beginning of drilling is tantamount to the beginning of construction, and the beginning of construction to the beginning of the war. The factual background: The decision for or against the "Gorleben disposal park" represents the decision for or against the further use of nuclear energy in the Federal Republic, because nuclear power plants have one serious flaw: They provide "clean energy"--or so say the advertisements of the electricity producers--but they also produce dangerous radioactive wastes which must be safely stored somewhere for the next millenium; the term used is "final storage." Salt mines, deep underground, are considered ideal storage. Interior Minister Gerhart Baum: Unless we quickly find a final storage site, we will have to switch off our nuclear power plants." Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt: Without a domestic atomic waste storage "we cannot have nuclear energy either."

Both sides are arming for battle. The Lower Saxon Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution reports that 200 active and possibly violent opponents of nuclear power have already taken up positions around Gorleben. Its scouts calculate that 2,000 demonstrators could be mobilized within the hour. The defenders of the state should know: Two young policemen infiltrated the resisters, pretending they wanted to obtain their high school graduation certificates in Goettingen. The two "agents" (cover

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names "Wikky" and "Rudi") repeatedly but unsuccessfully tried to nail the nuclear opponents to a line of outright confrontation: "That will cause a disturbance."

For fear of riots Gorleben has become a fortress even before the onset of construction. The Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Wiederaufarbeitung von Kernbrennstoffen (DWK) [German Company for the Reprocessing of Nuclear Fuels], owner of the "disposal park," met with the Land police authorities in Hannover and noted the following: "The police are firmly persuaded that the opponents of the project will sooner or later take massive and drastic steps...It would therefore be entirely wrong to yield to the concept that massive security measures might arouse negative impressions among the public. The planning staff of the police 'plainly rejected' our proposal initially to begin drilling with fewer security precautions and embark on 'the construction of a fortified defense' only when the necessity is evident."

Nuclear energy objectors are to be deterred by the resolute armament of the state power: 1,200 policemen and 500 men from the border defense force will guard the construction site as if the peaceful use of nuclear energy were inconceivable without large numbers of constantly loaded guns. Furthermore the Federal Government has already assured Lower Saxony of financial compensation for any damage caused by demonstrations: This is carried as "compensation for reasons of equity" in the contract promising the Land DM200 million of Federal money for incidental expenses in the next 4 years. To be armed against the anticipated general attack by demonstrators, the police are having all woods clearcut within 100 meters of every deep drilling site; at the same time they are constructing man-high defensive walls which in turn will be surrounded by 3 meter high barbed wire barricades. In between the two will be electrified fences and microphones transmitting every sound, behind them searchlights to lighten up the surroundings--only a few kilometers away from the inhuman border security installations of the GDR.

According to the DWK it will be necessary "for the implementation of this concept " permanently to keep under observation a wide area around the drilling sites, something which "should properly be a matter for the police." The residents of the Luechow-Dannenberg Rural Kreis will have to get used to living cheek by jowl with the state security forces. Not that this prospect appears to scare them: There are few nuclear objectors in this region. The majority of citizens in this poor kreis hope for new jobs and a business revival.

The Wendish land, flanked on three sides by the GDR and on the fourth by the erstwhile royal hunting forest of Goehrde, is the Federal Republic's weakest rural kreis in terms of population and structure. The site of the "disposal park" was selected not by salt mining or nuclear experts; the choice was made by the department for business promotion at the Lower Saxon Ministry of Economics.

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Official in charge Chojnacki was given the difficult assignment of choosing the appropriate salt mine from 23 which appeared more or less suitable. He resolved the problem with the help of a points system he himself drew up to ascertain and evaluate all criteria which had either been furnished him or which he thought of himself: Closeness to sources of household water supplies, accessibility of motorways, nearness of nuclear warhead silos, likelihood of earthquakes or meteorite impact, special features of the construction site and property rights, effects on the recreational use of the respective area, and particularly on the structure of the local economy. Leaders on points were the mines at Gorleben on the Upper Elbe, Aschendorf in the Emsland and Lichtenmoor on the Upper Weser. Aschendorf was out of contention once secret test drills had aroused the resident population. Since Gorleben anyway had a 10 percent advantage, the lower Saxon cabinet merely had to give its blessing. Chojnacki commented after the event: "A cuckoo's egg--we did not choose it."

The "cuckoo's egg" may well turn out to be a time bomb. Hamburg geomorphologist Prof Eckhard Grimmel considers such final storage of the radioactive waste the "worst of all possibilities." Last week his Goettingen colleague Prof Albert Guenter Herrmann expressed agreement: "From geoscientific aspects the worst and most inappropriate solution conceivable." The same appreciation is gaining ground in America also.

Some of the stored waste will emit radiation at the temperature of a boiling ring at stage 3, and continue to do so for many years. Critics fear that this heat could cause the water contained in the salt to turn into steam. Should this steam disintegrate the salt, fissures would form which might be further enlarged by the movement of the earth. Ground water could invade such fissures and gradually dissolve the stocks of salt. Professor Grimmel complains that the Gorleben salt mine is particularly ill suited for final nuclear waste disposal. He believes to have found definite indications that the earth's crust there is still capable of movement.

The local residents are quite content with the site selection. True, the majority of Federal Germans is skeptical with respect to nuclear energy. The latest STERN polls ascertained that 53 percent of the population reject new nuclear power plants, and that in northern Germany nuclear power opponents (37 percent) are definitely more numerous than advocates (32 percent). (STERN, Nos 47/1978 and 1/1979). But for the time being any referendum in Luechow-Dannenberg Rural Kreis would yield a tremendous yes vote for the "disposal park."

A poll conducted by the DWK did show, though, that most residents have very little idea of what in fact is planned for their neighborhood. Involved in the Gorleben scheme is more than merely the construction of a subterranean atomic waste deposit which is invisible, inaudible and unscented. Planned is the greatest new industrial construction in European history. The pyramids of the pharaohs would be as nothing by comparison. Construction costs of the storage within the salt mine have been assessed at DM1.5 billion; the

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DWK estimates another DM 10 billion for construction and incidental costs of plant above ground. Never before has such a sum been planned for a single industrial project.

The facilities will consist of huge concrete bunkers, up to 60 meters high. Behind the facade, meters thick and windowless, the spent fuel elements of all German atomic reactors will be stored for months and weeks in cooled water tanks and gradually sawed apart. Their content will be dissolved in boiling nitric acid and, by chemical means, separated into reusable uranium, plutonium and waste. Uranium and plutonium will be processed on the spot into new fuel elements, the waste infused into glass, cement or bitumen and lowered into the salt caverns deep under Gorleben to be sealed away for all eternity.

The fuel element receiving station alone will be so vast that the largest house in the rural kreis would disappear in the basement of this 40 meter high bunker. August Quis, construction director of Luechow-Dannenberg Rural Kreis, says: "The drawings indicate internal wall strengths of 3 meters. That is nearly impossible from the technical aspect. On top of that the reactor safety commission calls for additional security measures. Just try to imagine the dimensions of all this--it is sheer madness!"

Such thicknesses of concrete are necessary to secure the structures against crashed aircraft and restrain radioactive radiation. Some experts, Quis among them, doubt that the soft soil of the Elbe bottomland can in fact carry such masses of concrete. He wrote a letter to the superior kreis director: "I cannot escape the impression that we have here an act of human hubris. Its failure can be predicted just as surely as it was possible in 1941 to forecast the failure of the Russian campaign."

Salt dumps will overtop even the giant bunkers. Every year the unsaleable rubble removed from the underground construction will fill a football field to a height of a tower--a new field each year. Nothing can be planted on these tips, because soil spread on it immediately becomes salt logged.

Even in the course of the 10-year construction period the Luechow-Dannenberg Rural Kreis--now known as a recreation area for the north German conurbations--will be radically changed. The present quiet in the region is such that this rural kreis is the last in Germany not to have even one traffic light. The Gorleben nuclear factory will change all that. Already in the mid-1980's (according to a study kept under lock and key) 300 trucks and nearly 6,000 cars per day will make for the construction site; on peak days up to 40 percent more. Bypasses will have to be constructed around 14 villages, the road linking Gorleben with Luechow, the kreis city, will be re-located, and a rail link is planned to relieve truck traffic.

Particularly affected by the giant construction site will be the Lucie nature reserve. New roads, rails and high-voltage power lines will cut across it in the northeast, where some of the last cranes to be found in

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Germany now are nesting, and also across the southern extension planned for the reserve. Moreover, just below its western border it is planned to quarry the nearly 2 million cubic meters of gravel needed for the concrete bunkers. Also adversely affected will be the Elbe Bank-Drawohn nature park and the Elbaue marshes which are to be put under conservation in accordance with an international agreement. Both are immediately adjacent to the site.

Anyone wishing to know what Gorleben is going to look like may get some idea in the farthest northeast of France. There, 30 km from Cherbourg, a small version of the planned nuclear factory stands at Cap de la Hague: The reprocessing plant of the state owned "Cogema" company. There--as is planned for the "disposal park"--spent reactor rods are made into new fuels.

Shortly before the end of the year the Federal Research Ministry organized an inspection tour to the French Cap de la Hague by two dozen labor unionists from Lower Saxony. The visit turned out to be a total disaster: Hardly had the tour begun when the visitors noticed men on the site, who--dressed in protective clothing--searched the grounds outside. "A mere nothing," they were told. The "mere nothing" turned out to be a nuclear accident. A protective filter, radioactively contaminated, had dissolved in corrosive steam and been exhausted into the air via the chimney. The wind wafted the radiating and health hazardous fragments across the region.

Two days earlier another incident had far more serious consequences: Several rooms were contaminated when radiant material was transported. Also contaminated were seven workers, three of them so badly that they run a serious risk of developing lung cancer at some future time. The balance sheet of contamination for the previous year: 388 accidents with external or internal radiation of workers or rooms--on the average more than one per day.

Since the incidence of accidents surged from 280 in 1973 to 572 in 1975 the works management has stopped publishing official figures. It became known nevertheless that a shocking record has prevailed since early 1977: In the 4 weeks from 23 January to 21 February only a single day went by without an accident; the alarm was sounded 42 times. Five times in a single week was it necessary to clear the sheds by reason of unduly great radioactive contamination of the floor.

When the labor unionists returned home their Land executive in Hannover decided on the following: "Should a similar facility be constructed in Gorleben, conditions such as prevail in La Hague would not be acceptable." Yet the doubts of the unionists (who in the meantime obtained the support of the DGB) will hardly be able to prevent the mammoth Gorleben project. The Federal Government has made up its mind about nuclear circulation. Spent nuclear elements from traditional reactors are to be reprocessed into new fuel which, in turn, will heat the reactors. By this means uranium imports may be stretched by about a third. The plutonium provided thereby is intended later to fuel the fast breeder at Kalkar.

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In the government's opinion and that of the nuclear industry three factors advocate this circulation: The highly toxic and dangerous plutonium--the explosive for nuclear bombs--is stored nowhere more safely than in the reactor. The waste remaining after reprocessing is less hazardous than untreated waste--although only relatively so: It emits dangerous radiation for about 1,000 instead of 100,000 years. And the energy balance of the Federal Republic would be drastically improved: Once Gorleben is in full operation, the recovered residual energy from spent nuclear elements will correspond to half the German production of hard coal.

Yet good reasons may be cited against reprocessing: It is very expensive, so expensive that the major German chemical enterprises, headed by Hoechst and Bayer, dropped as too costly their plans for construction of a reprocessing plant. And as we have seen in La Hague, it is very risky. Moreover, nobody yet has any real experience how these things work at the technical level and on a large scale. The German demonstration reprocessing plant at Karlsruhe still spends millions on new test equipment parts.

U.S. President Carter reacted to the technical difficulties--as yet unsolved--by stopping, at least for the time being, all American reprocessing plans. Breakdowns and environmental problems had already caused the three commercial plants so far built in the United States to be either shut down or not even started up.

In the meantime no permits are issued for new facilities built in accordance with the current status of technology. The British facility in Windscale also was switched off after a radiation accident in 1973. It is doubtful whether the radiating investment ruin will ever become operational again. At this time, therefore, the French and their plant in La Hague and another planned factory hold a monopoly in the Western world--admittedly they also have a monopoly of the breakdowns, incidents and difficulties involved. They extract a heavy payment: They charge nearly DM1 million for reprocessing 1 ton of reactor fuel.

The French can afford to charge such prices. The 15 nuclear power plants and test reactors now available in the Federal Republic may be operated only if their "disposal," that is the removal of all radioactive waste, is secured. Up to now a contract with the La Hague firm "Cogema" was recognized as proof of disposal for the issue of operating permits required annually--and at the same time at least one eye was firmly closed. Because "Cogema" will be unable to keep its contracts for the foreseeable future. La Hague can manage only to process French fuel elements. Residues from German reactors contain up to 10 times more plutonium. And La Hague evidently cannot cope with this in the new wing of the plant constructed for just this purpose.

The only test run using German material, barely 60 tons of fuel from the Stade power plant, took more than 3 months. Subsequently the facility had to be switched off. For Gorleben all equipment is therefore planned in

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double if not quadruple quantities. Such security provisions create problems: The life of this equipment is at best 25 years, in some areas only 7. After that the factory sheds must be decontaminated and some of them also "disposed of."

As the La Hague facility is in fact not useable now, the Federal German nuclear power plants were compelled to take recourse to a questionable type of self-help: The spent nuclear elements are stored in water cooled decay tanks for several years, because nobody knows where to dispose of the radiant waste.

Atomic waste is rising right up to the necks of the electricity producers at the Messian Biblis A power plant, for example. They have therefore adopted the trick of "compact storage": Instead of packing in the decay tanks 2 years "output" of spent fuel rods, as initially planned, they now intend to pack 6 years output. So far they are still waiting for permission. If it is refused, Biblis A will have to cut back or cease production within the year. The alternative is to find someone to take the highly radioactive residue off their hands. It is contemplated, therefore, to fill the decay tanks of new power plants with fuel rods from other reactors which no longer have sufficient storage room. But even that will not do to any larger extent. There are hardly any new nuclear reactors. Businessmen and increased objections by environmentalists are delaying the planned reactor program. Nor will "Cogema" in La Hague be able for some time to come to accept any more Federal German radioactive waste, because "Cogema" storage tanks are also full. And they are expecting more supplies: 1,600 tons from Japan, the advance guard of which was landed at Cherbourg last week--to the accompaniment of violent protests from residents. By 1985 another 1,705 tons are to be delivered by the Federal Republic.

However, the validity of these contracts is in some doubt, because they include a clause giving "Cogema" the right to return to the customer only 97 percent of the plutonium. As the Federal Government is aware that the loss of no more than 1 percent of plutonium is involved in processing, the French obviously retain 2 percent of the basic nuclear bomb material. That is likely to violate international agreements. The Federal Government has signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, France has not. The Federal Interior Ministry is therefore showing growing reluctance to continue recognizing "Cogema" contracts as evidence of disposal. The fuel rod depositories in Gorleben, capable of receiving 3,000 tons, will then be even more urgently needed.

Yet Gorleben is already 2 years behind schedule. And political resistance to the nuclear factory is still increasing. Not the "fast breeder" at Kalkar represents the entrance to the feared "plutonium business" but the plutonium factory at the Lower Saxon GDR border.

It is even doubtful whether use of nuclear energy will be possible in the Federal Republic even with Gorleben. The reason: Nuclear power plants are not nearly so safe as used to be assumed. Earlier calculations were based

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on the American Rasmussen report on reactor safety. This study concluded that the likelihood of a serious reactor accident was one in a million years--just as minimal as the crash of a large meteorite on a city. New calculations, however, have shown that the probability is at least 5-10 times greater. Last week the Rasmussen report was withdrawn as faulty.

PHOTO CAPTIONS

1. p 82. The pyramids of the pharaohs are as nothing by comparison: At a cost of DM12 billion the biggest industrial building complex of European history is being constructed in Gorleben. The center of the disposal park is the reprocessing facility for spent reactor rods. Its attics alone are the size of a village center.
2. p 83. The radiating giant: Without the Gorleben "disposal park" nuclear energy in the Federal Republic is finished. The electricity producers in the nuclear reactors are up to their necks in nuclear waste--and nobody knows where to get rid of it.
3. p 84. Superscription at top of page: The scale drawing shows how highly radioactive nuclear waste is fused with glass into cylindrical blocks and subsequently stored in the salt strata below the facility. At a depth of more than 1,000 meters radioactivity gradually decays--in thousands of years. Above ground occur radioactive gases, krypton 85 and iodine 129. Silver filters costing DM30,000 have been developed for the iodine; they hold up for exactly 1 week. Krypton is to be skimmed off at a temperature of minus 180 centigrade, in a liquid state. The problems involved in handling these gases caused the designers initially to provide for a waste gas exhaust 400 meters high. They also called for a buffer zone, 6 km wide, to be kept empty of human beings; this would have meant the destruction of 20 villages in the region. In the meantime, it is claimed, such drastic measures are no longer necessary.
On the right of the page: Storage tanks with liquid atomic waste. They have to be permanently cooled.
On the left of the page: Medium-active atomic waste has been stored in salt for the past 6 years--in the former Asse II potash mine near Brunswick. The radiating tin containers can be viewed through a 80 cm thick lead glass window.
4. p 85. (1) Elevator. It sends down to the depths about 5 glass blocks per day.
(2) Solidifying facility. Liquid nuclear waste is processed into solid glass blocks.
(3) Water tanks. Here the highly radioactive glass blocks are stored for at least 1 year to decay and cool off.

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- (4) At least 1,000 meters lie between the surface of the earth and the final storage for highly radioactive nuclear waste.
 - (5) Concrete plugs. They close off filled boreholes.
 - (6) Remote controlled loaders. They lower the glass blocks (temperature: above 200 degrees centigrade) into the boreholes.
 - (7) Tunnel to the next gallery. Each salt gallery receives 1 year's production of nuclear waste.
 - (8) Boreholes in the salt. Depth about 40 meters, diameter 35 cm.
5. p 86. The salt tips will tower above the countryside--similar to this potash tip east of Hannover: Rubber from the inner earth to make room for atomic waste. For centuries to come no tree or bush will be able to grow on these tips.

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WEST GERMANY

FRG OFFICIAL REVIEWS WORK OF FRG-GDR BORDER COMMISSION

Bonn EUROPA-ARCHIV in German 10 Jan 79 pp 19-28

[Article by Dr. jur. Klaus Otto Nass, until 1976 department chairman at the European Commission in Brussels, now state secretary in the Ministry for Economics of Lower Saxony and for a period of almost 2 years, 1976-1978, Lower Saxony's member of the Border Commission]

[Text] The Protocol Over the Inner-German Border

For a period of almost 6 years, from 31 January 1973 until 28 November 1978, the Commission, consisting of delegates from the governments of the FRG and the GDR (Border Commission), met at irregular but never too distant intervals, alternating between towns of both German states, usually close to the border, before the leaders of both delegations, each for his own government, on 29 November 1978 signed a document in Bonn which is identified as a "Protocol" between the two governments.

A contract regarding the foundations of the relationship between the FRG and the GDR (Basic Treaty) of 21 December 1972 had created this mixed commission. It had given it a dual task: first, to control the border markings between the two states and, if necessary, to renew or supplement them, as well as to compile the necessary documentation regarding the course of the border; secondly, the Border Commission was "likewise" to contribute to the "settlement of other border-related problems, e.g., water rights, supply of energy and pest control."¹

With this Protocol, which consists of five articles and a footnote regarding the Elbe River, the governments sanction the results of all past work by the Border Commission. The Border Commission had submitted a report about its past work, which is attached to the Protocol as Appendix I.² Further attached to the Protocol are: Parts of the border documentation, as well as a total of 20 agreements regarding other border-related problems, 12 of which had already gone into effect before the signing of the Protocol and another 7 of which became effective at the time of signing but which had been (with one exception) in tentative use "beforehand." A few of these agreements have only local significance for a certain area near the border, but others would merit thorough consideration, which must be omitted here because of limited space.

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Prominent among these important texts is the regulation regarding pest control at the border and principles regarding upkeep and extension of water resources at the border, as well as their water supply installations; further agreements about fishing in Lubeck Bay, soft coal mining in the Harbke-Helmstedt area, which covers land on both sides of the border, as well as border crossings by recreational boats and other amphibious vehicles on the Werra and Saale rivers. As far as the marking tasks of the Border Commission are concerned, it is evident from former documents and the report of the Border Commission that 1,296.7 km of border have been surveyed geodetically. Not yet surveyed are border sectors 7-9 (Elbe River) (approximately 95 km) and a part of border section 24 (Warne Bode) (approximately 1.2 km).³

Peculiarities of Inner-German Border Determination

The past work of the Border Commission shows peculiarities in at least three different respects:

First, according to Article 2 of the treaty regarding relations between the FRG and the Three Powers (German Treaty) of 26 May 1952, the Three Powers (France, Great Britain, United States) retained those rights and responsibilities regarding Berlin and Germany as a whole and after the transition of sovereignty to the FRG which they had held and exercised up until then within the framework of the Four Power agreements. Therefore, the government of the Federal Republic was not empowered to agree to any deviation from the demarcation line of the inner-German border, which had been drawn by the occupational powers.

The GDR acknowledged this limited sovereignty in Article 9 of the Basic Treaty, which provides "that through this treaty no earlier treaties by them [the FRG and the GDR], or international treaties between two or more parties concerning them, shall be affected."

This determination was related expressly to the agreements among the Allies in correspondence between Federal Minister Egon Bahr and Secretary of State Michael Kohl. In accordance with this general limitation, both parties to the treaty stated concretely in the Basic Treaty: "The course of the border...is established according to the determinations in the London Protocol of 12 September 1944. Wherever the border deviates locally from these determinations on the basis of later agreements of the occupational powers, its exact line is determined and marked by the Commission at the site in question taking into consideration all relevant facts."⁴

The practical consequence of this legal position was sometimes costly research into the intentions of the occupational powers as expressed either in writing, orally or by inference. Thereby the "customarily used border" visible in the terrain, which had not been changed after control passed into German hands, served as an essential guideline.

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Secondly: In spite of this unambiguous binding of the work of the Border Commission to the allied agreements regarding the borderline, different interpretations regarding border rights exist on both sides. This discrepancy is openly stated in the Basic Treaty, the introduction to which expressly mentions the "differing opinions" of both states "on basic questions, among them on the national question." To the GDR it is a national border which is subject only to international law.⁵ The FRG, on the other hand, goes by the ruling of its Supreme Court, which describes the border "as a border between two states under constitutional law," with the "peculiarity that it exists on the foundation of the still existing state of 'Germany as a whole,' so that it is therefore a state border similar to those between the states of the Federal Republic."⁶

This difference of opinion regarding the legality was in itself without significance as far as determination of the intra-German borderline is concerned. However, it gained in significance through the initial attempt of the GDR to formulate the documentation which concludes the past work of the Border Commission. This attempt failed, as will be shown below.

The "border policies"⁷ of the GDR are the third notable element, although it is not the task of the Border Commission to treat them as such. Incidents along the border adversely affected current talks more than once. The FRG delegation tried to contribute to clearing up and avoiding such incidents. It was beyond the powers of the West German delegation to prevent the GDR from systematically building up its fortified installations, even during the last 6 years. The Border Commission has, nevertheless, contributed to a decrease of tensions at the intra-German border to an extent which is not yet fully measurable.

About the Problematic Nature of a Comprehensive Document

Determination of the border is at any rate one prerequisite among others for the prevention of border conflicts. Why did the FRG agree to this Protocol which, although it clarifies the borderline, does not noticeably lessen the inhumanity of the GDR "border policies"? This question ultimately contains a criticism of the Basic Treaty, which established the Border Commission and charged it with the determination of the borderline and the handling of other borderline-related problems. The Basic Treaty is, however, in the interpretation given by the Supreme Court, the legal authority; pacta sunt servanda.

But isn't there a danger that the GDR will attempt to attribute to this Protocol the character of a treaty, of an international border treaty? Surely the GDR would like to see the Border Commission as a commission exclusively under international law. In the opinion of the FRG, however, what is special about the Basic Treaty (and, therefore, the Border Commission as well) is "that, although it is a bilateral treaty between two states which is subject to international law and which has the same validity as any other international treaty, it is between two states which are parts of a still existing, if inoperative, encompassing state of a

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total Germany with a homogeneous population...⁸ No one can expect that the GDR will embrace this view. Anyone not wanting to supply the GDR with the pretext for describing a document as a purely international treaty would have to simply reject any negotiations and agreements with the GDR.

At any rate, it was advantageous to recapitulate the extensive results of years of work of the Border Commission. If one wishes to appreciate the chosen form of a government protocol, it must be seen against the background of the interests of both negotiating partners. While possibly a report of the Border Commission could, in some respects, have been satisfactory to the Federal Republic, two demands of the GDR remain unfulfilled, namely, the conclusion of a formal treaty and its formal ratification.

In other respects, certain aspects of the discussion (which ensued during the provisional signing of the document in the FRG) over the treaty nature of the Protocol in the sense of Article 102 of the UN Charter⁹ did not address the actual problem. The document is, in view of the special nature of intra-German relations, not an "international" agreement; in particular, neither the Basic Treaty nor its subsequent agreements are filed with the United Nations. But even if the document could be registered with the UN Secretariat, the exclusively declaratory character of the border determination in the border documentation could in no way be disputed. The decisive criteria for judging the government Protocol is this question: does the document contain a constitutional border determination, or does it merely give the appearance of an autonomous agreement between the two German states regarding the course of the border separating them.

Not a Constitutional Border Determination

The answer is unambiguous: No. The more intensively one examines the wording of the Protocol, the more it becomes clear that it does not permit any other interpretation. Even its Preamble makes clear that the entire document rests "on the basis of the treaty of 21 December 1972," which had instituted the Border Commission. Taken into consideration are Article 9 regarding rights reserved to the Allies, as well as the Protocol definition regarding the tasks of the Border Commission, with its express reference to the London Protocol and later agreements there between the occupational powers. In addition, the addendum which outlines the tasks of the Border Commission and the Protocol definition mentioned above are cited five additional times (Art 1, par 3; Art 4, par 1; Protocol footnote Elbe No 1; Protocol footnote Elbe No 2; Report of the Border Commission No 1). One can hardly imagine a closer interpretation of the Basic Treaty clause, in which the GDR also expressly acknowledged the principle of a nonconstitutional border drawn by the occupational powers. To the contrary, 34 years after the conclusion of the London Protocol a common text of both German states refers to this Allied legal foundation.

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Nor can this interpretation of the text be weakened by referring to the fact that the Preamble contains clauses which in part appear to be derived from the Final Act of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] (e.g., "refraining from threats of force or use of force," "inviability" of the border, "unlimited respect for territorial integrity"), or those which belong to the universally recognized rules of international law. All elements within the Preamble are (also) contained in the Basic Treaty (Preamble and Article 3, which is the basis of the Border Commission), and any enumeration in the Preamble of the document is subordinated to the reference to the Basic Treaty by the preceding word "accordingly" ("on the basis of the treaty...accordingly in the effort..."). Thus it is clear: The Basic Treaty is the sole basis for the Protocol, and neither formulas of the CSCE Final Act nor general rules of international law, but only parts of the Basic Treaty, are repeated in the Preamble of the Protocol.

This interpretation of the document as a text which merely notes but does not change the borderline is confirmed in many instances; such as when the "existing" border is mentioned (heading, Article 1, etc.), such as when Article 2 speaks expressly of the "determined course of the border existing between the FRG and the GDR," and simply by the fact that both governments have evidently not reached agreement on the Preamble, as in the Basic Treaty, but rather merely say that they "agree."

Finally, the government Protocol itself does not mention border markings, but rather confirms that the work of the Border Commission agrees with the Basic Treaty. This border documentation has been available for years at the Bureau of Survey for the respective border segments. Both sides in the Border Commission had agreed on the points in time on which they based their practical measures from the verified, marked and surveyed borderline.

It is unambiguous that the text has neither drawn new borders nor claims to autonomously redraw the borders drawn according to occupational law. And in addition: the document, in contrast to the Basic Treaty, changes nothing as far as the legal nature of the border is concerned, nor does it change the legal character of the relations between the two German states. After the signing of the document, as well as before, these relations have the same character as that outlined by the Federal Supreme Court decision of 31 July 1973.

From that it can also be concluded that the FRG cannot be accused of not having improved its legal position as compared with the Basic Treaty. Such a basic improvement was not the goal of the negotiations, and could not be the goal of the negotiations, if the corresponding intentions of the GDR were to be met with as much success as was actually achieved (e.g., the GDR intention to conclude a treaty with constitutional clauses), considering the initial regulations binding both sides.

There might also be criticism of the fact that the Preamble of this Protocol did not--as, for example, the Preamble of the Four Power Pact of 3 September

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1971 on Berlin--contains a passage like "without damaging their legal position." Even such criticism would misunderstand the character of this Protocol, which is dependent on the Basic Treaty (especially regarding the national question and citizenship problems). On the contrary, an un-specific, general, legal reservation on both sides which deviated from the Basic Treaty would have given to the GDR a pretext for claiming that the Protocol had departed from the understanding achieved in the Basic Treaty binding the obligations of the occupational powers. A reservation was indeed included where it was meaningful, namely, regarding the unsolved Elbe River question.

The Omission of the Elbe River

In four border segments (Elbe and part of the Harzbach Warne Bode) there was a failure to achieve an understanding on the borderline determined by the occupational powers. The problems relating to the course of the Elbe border¹⁰ cannot be dealt with in this report. It may suffice to mention that the Second Criminal Panel of the Supreme Court in justifying a decision, stated on 2 February 1977: "At Elbekilometer 540.5, according to historic development, the border between the FRG and the GDR runs along the east bank of the Elbe River"; the GDR, on the other hand, according to a decision by the chairman of its highest court on 9 November 1977, assumes a movable border on the river, namely, the lowest point of the valley, that is, the channel.

As far as the Elbe River is concerned, the work of the Border Commission is not yet concluded but continues. Both parties are in agreement on this in the document (Protocol Art 1; Protocol footnote Elbe No 1 and 2). Therefore, it was not a case of the application of Protocol definition No 3 of the tasks of the Border Commission, which states: "If the Commission cannot reach agreement on a problem at hand, this problem will be submitted by both sides to their governments, which will settle it by way of negotiations."

By this formal statement, which essentially agrees not to agree, government negotiations on the Elbe border could be avoided. The GDR, on the other hand, had a fundamental interest in continuing work on this problem, especially since the unresolved Elbe border could be considered a symbol of the unresolved German question. In spite of this symbolic content, the FRG could, even had to, consent to the GDR wish not to change the legal position outlined in the Basic Treaty through this Protocol, especially in compliance with the above-mentioned principle. For that reason it was able to confirm that the mission of the Border Commission, which has no time limit, remains in existence.

Thus, what is in effect is the expressly stated willingness to continue the work not only of ascertaining the course of the border but also of other related problems, for example, the exercise of fishing rights on the entire river and in the sloughs of its eastern bank. The FRG's interest in solving such questions was quite intense but nevertheless did not lead it to question basic principles for the sake of practical solutions.

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Avoidable Border Incidents

Even in the future the lack of ambiguity which could be achieved at other border segments through border documentation will, therefore, not be achieved at the Elbe River, which, incidentally, is a Federal waterway according to the addendum to the Federal Waterways Law of 2 April 1968. But, now as before, the river is navigated by ships of the FRG and the GDR. In the Protocol footnote mentioned above, both sides start from the premise that the traffic treaty of 26 May 1972 continues to apply to this area. This treaty, however, does not regulate in detail the coexistence of ships from both states on the Elbe River (compare, especially, the Protocol footnote to Article 23 of the traffic treaty).¹¹ In view of the bilaterally unregulated responsibilities and the unresolved borderline, the potential for conflict on this river can flare up at any time. The previously mentioned principles for pest control at the border which were worked out by the Border Commission on 20 September actually also apply to the border segments in the Elbe region; but, for example, the bilateral obligation it contains, "to take all possible measures...to prevent the occurrence of damages to the area of the other state" (Article 4), presumes an agreement as to where the area of the other state begins and one's own area ends.

For that reason, there is special significance in that part of the Protocol footnote referring to Elbe-related problems which says: "Until an agreement is reached, both sides will continue to take into consideration the circumstance that the work regarding border segments 7-9 has not been concluded." In clauses, both governments thus declare their willingness to avoid conflicts which could arise through the unresolved border question in the Elbe area. This sentence does not contain a bias favoring a certain course of the border, not even in the reference to the past ("will continue to"); it particularly does not provide any binding arrangement which goes beyond the traffic treaty regarding existing practice on the Elbe River. "With all measures"--those are measures in "border segments 7 to 9." Where the border runs, whether on the river itself or along the east bank sloughs, remains open. Additionally, the following sentence contains a reservation regarding the "interpretation of the legal position."

The value of such clauses is, however, questionable, as long as the views about a "provocation" at the border are as far apart as they are between the GDR and the FRG. When the GDR party secretary, Erich Honecker, declares, "In 1976 alone more than 1,000 provocations and attempts against our border troops were made by the FRG," then he has--assuming the number is correct--counted every furrow that a West German farmer has illegally, but not necessarily intentionally, plowed on GDR soil. Such border violations by the GDR are not even possible, because the land at the border is not used agriculturally; rather, there is a continuous belt of fortifications and barrier installations between the border and the population which is meant to prevent not only accidental, but especially intentional, border crossings from east to west.

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The situation is similar in the border region of the Elbe River: while anyone may row on or swim in the river from the west bank of the river, river access from the GDR side is prohibited to private individuals. A West German pleasure boat which gets into the eastern sloughs is considered a border provocateur. However, not every West German pleasure boater acts as the somewhat dangerous situation demands. If the GDR should desire a conflict on the Elbe River, it could always create or find a pretext. Whether all is "calm" on the Elbe River does not depend on what is happening on the river as much as on the total nature of the relations between the two neighbors. Clauses like the one cited above are proof of the good will--at least at present--of the signatories. As for the rest, the border practices of the GDR, as long as they are not fundamentally changed, undeniably remain "a special hindrance to the normalization of relations."¹²

Future Tasks of the Border Commission

Can the Border Commission help prevent border incidents in the future? According to the Protocol, the Border Commission continues in existence. When the Border Commission began its activities, both delegations had stated in Protocol footnotes that the agreements on pest control and border waters were to go "into effect together with the documents concluding the work of the Border Commission." Its task, however, has no time limit, according to the Basic Treaty. The future tasks of the Border Commission will be (besides continued advice on Elbe-related problems) the checking and, if necessary, replacing of markers, participation in the carrying out of agreements concluded or prepared by it, as well as "discussion of further problems related to the course of the border."¹³ The responsibility of the Border Commission to contribute to the settlement of border incidents, which is thus implied, does not limit the jurisdiction of the permanent representatives in Bonn and East Berlin; neither are parallel actions on both avenues excluded. But routine methods on the bureaucratic level in a regularly convening commission are sometimes better suited for easing the situation than proceedings of a more political nature.

The Protocol now concluded refers expressly to the legal principles which have applied until now for the work of the Border Commission (Art 4, par 1; Art 4, par 2; as well as "principles according to Article 4" attached as Appendix IV). With that it is made clear that this is the same Border Commission that the Basic Treaty instituted and not a new commission based on this Protocol. To be sure, some policies which until now have been unofficially in use are not specified in writing; but as before, Article 3, Addendum to the Protocol, and the Protocol definitions of the Basic Treaty remain in effect. Further evidence of this is the fact that, although work on border segments 7 to 9 is to be "continued," the decisive determinations of the Basic Treaty (as, for example, the passage stating that "the necessary documentation regarding the borderline" must be compiled are not repeated.

The Border Commission will therefore continue to deal with all problems relating to markings and the borderline. As before there is no possibility

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of direct negotiations between, for example, a West German Kreis administration or state administration with the corresponding local officials of the GDR. That does not rule out the possibility that local experts (e.g., a geodeticist) can be consulted or given special assignments by the Border Commission. Two reasons are decisive for this concentration of tasks: First- the centrally organized GDR is totally unwilling to delegate power; and second, the special nature of inner-German relations includes a central jurisdiction of the FRG in relation to the GDR which might even exceed the general rights of the Federation to foreign representation as laid down in Article 32 of the Constitution. It even governs matters within the FRG which are subject to exclusive international jurisdiction; this has been confirmed indirectly by the Federal Supreme Court in that it declared the Basic Treaty valid, not subject to modification by state legislatures, even in those cases in which it regulates international matters (e.g., Article 7 regarding cooperation in the cultural field, as well as point No 10 of the Addendum to Article 7 of the Protocol regarding radio and television).

As the above arguments have shown, the significance of the Protocol lies, on the one hand, in the confirmation that the border between the two states (except for Elbe and Warme Bode) was unambiguously marked and documented by the Border Commission, and, on the other hand, in the settlement of numerous, mostly local problems.

The border policies of the GDR are, however, not relaxed by this Protocol; they continue to burden the relations between the FRG and the GDR. But the Border Commission has, in the past, contributed to the avoidance, or rather, settlement of border incidents. It is hoped that it will succeed in that in the future as well.

The policy of keeping the German question open will be successful only if both states continue to talk and if misunderstandings and prejudices are reduced. On the other side, the GDR leadership, for reasons of self-identity, continues to need a policy of demarcation toward the FRG, which limits the possibilities of talks. Seen in this light, the Border Commission does not contribute to the German partition but, on the contrary, by continuous dialog, to increased bilateral understanding.

FOOTNOTES

1. Article 3, Basic Treaty of 21 December 1972; Addendum to Protocol to Article 3, Basic Treaty, as well as Protocol definition of the tasks of the Border Commission by both leaders of the delegation, also of 21 December 1972. Quoted in BGBI II, 1973/1, p 421 ff; EA 1/1973, p D13 ff.
2. Compare Protocol wording and certain attachments on p D3 ff.
3. Compare in detail: "The Border Commission--A Documentation of Principles and Activities," published by the Federal Ministry for Inner-German Relations, Bonn, November 1978.

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4. Protocol Definition (footnote 1).
5. Compare, for example, Erich Honecker, interview by SAARBRUECKER ZEITUNG, 19, 20 and 21 February 1978; excerpts in EA 20/1978, p 549 ff (550).
6. Constitutional Law of 31 July 1973, Constitutional Laws Vol 36, p 26. For an apparently differing opinion, see Karl Kuiser and Peter Roggen, "The Eastern Policies of the FRG in the framework of Western Politics of Detente," in "Die internationale Politik 1970-72," Muenchen-Wien 1978, p 179.
7. Compare "Woerterbuch zum Sozialistischen Staat," Dietz-Verlag, Berlin 1974, p 343.
8. Constitutional Laws, Vol 36, p 23.
9. Compare FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 27 October 1978.
10. Compare Dietrich Rauschnig, "Festshrift fuer Eberhard Menzel, Berlin 1975 p. 492 ff.
11. Quoted in: EA 13/1972, p D320 ff (Protocol footnote p D327).
12. Federal minister for inner-German relations, "Report and Documentation of the Development of Relations Between the FRG and the GDR 1969-1976," p 17.
13. Compare No 21, paragraph 3 of the "Principles of Art. 4" of the Protocol, p D5.

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